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ABSTRACT 
 
As chemical process plants have become more involved and complex, the likelihood of 
hazardous incidents has increased simultaneously. That is, the more complex a facility’s 
systems, the more factors engineers must consider. This results in a higher likelihood of 
potential hazards being overlooked; thus, the possibility of incidents occurring increases.   
 
Many companies and organizations are struggling to identify their weaknesses and reduce 
hazardous issues by developing hazard identification (HAZID) tools, particularly for large 
and complex processes. Even though a considerable number of companies merely pursue 
this objective to conform to government regulations, their efforts play a critical role in 
improving their reputations and financial profits. Therefore, the advancement of HAZID 
tools in the process industries has taken significant strides over the last 40 years. 
 
Despite the substantial development of HAZID methods, traditional HAZID tools need 
further development because of their weaknesses in identifying possible hazards. In other 
words, it is evident that unintended incidents that occasionally occur in the chemical 
process industry require more enhanced HAZID methodologies. Therefore, this study 
attempts to ascertain the drawbacks of existing HAZID tools so that a new HAZID 
methodology, data-based semi-automatic hazard identification (DAHAZID), is proposed.  
Considering potential HAZID methodologies, this study seeks to identify possible 
scenarios with a semi-automatic and systemic approach. Based on the two traditional 
 iii 
 
HAZID tools, Hazard Operability study (HAZOP) and Failure Mode, Effects, and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), the DAHAZID method will minimize the limitations of 
each individual method. Additionally, rather than depending on the HAZID tools to 
achieve the connectivity of the process system, this study will consider connections with 
other new technologies in advance. Then, this method can be integrated with proper 
guidelines regarding process design and safety analysis. To examine its usefulness, the 
method will be applied to two case studies, and its outcome will be compared to the actual 
result, performed previously by a traditional HAZOP meeting.  
 
Hopefully, this research can contribute to the further development of the process safety 
field in practice. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Backgrounds and research directions 
This section goes over the background that resulted in the motivation for enhancing a 
hazard identification method. The associated regulations are described initially, followed 
by some clues from previous process incidents. 
 
1.1.1 Process hazard analysis and regulation 
Many companies in the process industry endeavored to prevent possible hazardous events 
with using Hazard Identification (HAZID)1 methods. This has been either on their own 
initiative so that the positive outcomes can help them obtain more commercial 
competitiveness, or the application is required under government regulations (CCPS, 
2008).  
 
HAZID vs. PHA 
Often, engineers use the two terms, HAZID and Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
interchangeably. However, HAZID is one of the activities required by PHA (Seligmann, 
2011). PHA originated as an official U.S term from Process Safety Management (PSM) 
within the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) regulations. When PHA 
is performed based on the regulation guidelines, it is mandatory to provide specific 
documentation and follow-up recommendations to confirm its proper execution. 
                                                 
1 Herein, HAZID means generally hazard identification, and does not refer to a specific tool. 
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Regarding the regulation of hazard identification and analysis, Appendix A shows several 
countries’ established regulations for process safety.  
 
The limitations of current PHA   
Despite the usefulness of PHA, current PHA methods as mentioned in OSHA US 
Regulations (1992), have limitations. For instance, as Hendershot (2006) asserts, the 
regulations grant  
 
Table 1 Classical limitations of process hazard analysis  
(CCPS, 2008; Seligmann, 2011) 
Category Issue Description 
Nature of the 
method 
Completeness 
There can never be a guarantee that all 
incident situations, causes, and effects have 
been considered 
Inscrutability 
The inherent nature of some hazard analysis 
techniques makes the results difficult to 
understand and use 
Nature of the 
analysis team 
Reproducibility 
Various aspects of hazard evaluations are 
sensitive to analyst assumptions; different 
experts, using identical information, may 
generate different results when analyzing the 
same problem 
Relevance of 
experience 
A hazard analysis team may not have an 
appropriate base of experience from which to 
assess the significance of potential incidents. 
Subjectivity 
Hazard analysts must use their judgment 
when extrapolating from their experience to 
determine whether a problem is important 
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the freedom to select one from among myriad PHA techniques, because employers must 
find the most appropriate methods for their plant. In other words, there are no clear 
guidelines for selecting optimum PHA techniques, which mainly depends on experience. 
Table 1 shows the general limitations of current PHA  (CCPS, 2008; Seligmann, 2011). 
The first limitation, completeness, is the most dominating one, as numerous incident 
scenarios had not been previously recognized as possible. 
 
1.1.2 Analysis of CSB reports2 
As an independent federal agency, the U.S Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board (CSB) has investigated incidents in the chemical industry since 1998. These 
exhaustive investigations are directed toward only the more serious chemical industry 
events. Nevertheless, the reports reveal multiple clues for identifying commonalities 
among process events, which is particularly pertinent for finding underlying root causes; 
the analysis of Baybutt (2016a) and Kaszniak (2010) represent the possible root causes of 
reported incidents by the CSB. 
                                                 
2 Rather than HAZID, this section uses the PHA term, which has a US regulatory connotation, because this 
section mentions reports from the CSB, a U.S. federal agency. 
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Figure 1. The analysis results of Kaszniak (2010) 
 
Of the forty-six CSB reports published between 1998 and 2008, Kaszniak (2010) pointed 
out that twenty-one cases were directly associated with PHA. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of the twenty-one cases concerning PHA; 43% (9 in 21) of cases fall into “No 
PHA performed.” 38% (8 in 21) are categorized as “no lessons learned” during PHA, and 
19% (4 in 21) are described as having “no credible hazard scenario at PHA”.  Specifically, 
in about 57% of incidents where a PHA had been performed before the incident, past 
experiences and conceivable scenarios had been overlooked. These observed data 
represent the perception of whether a current PHA has worked acceptably well.   
 
Furthermore, Baybutt (2016a) stresses other common aspects of incidents reviewed by the 
CSB. In particular, he states that there were many failed cases of proper process designs 
(28%) and safeguards (56%) of the incidents. Since these insufficiencies are generally 
related to the initial design, the competency of design and process engineers is crucial. 
Additionally, necessary safeguards were not applied, so the hierarchy of process control, 
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shown in Figure 2, was not applied effectively. Hence, the analysis of Baybutt (2016a) 
provides suggestions for a more reliable control system.  
 
Baybutt (2015b) analysed the types of failures and flaws of the primary PHA tool, the 
hazard and operability study (HAZOP), probably the most often applied HAZID tool in 
the worldwide chemical industry. One of the many causes of flaws is that in the HAZOP 
procedure deviation of a process variable is selected first, then in a backward direction is 
sought for the cause or causes, and subsequently in a forward direction shall be determined 
in what consequence it will result. In human thinking, however, one tends to start with a 
cause and then look for following effects. He also summarized competence requirements 
that are demanded of team members conducting a HAZOP (Baybutt, 2015a).  
 
 
Figure 2. Hierarchy of safeguards Baybutt (2016a)3 
 
                                                 
3 Baybutt (2016a) describes a hierarchy of safeguards as seven criteria, including an additional category, 
‘segregation and separation’, filling the space between inherently safer design and passive safeguards. 
However, we did not include this category in Figure 2, because it has overlapping aspects with other 
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1.2 Research objectives 
1.2.1 Attempt to achieve an enhanced HAZID tool  
To achieve a useful HAZID tool, this research proposes a new methodology for more 
systematic and semi-automated approaches. Rather than focusing on the specific parts of 
a system, a holistic system analysis is expected to have the strength of identifying the 
actual root causes and consequences of incidents. Furthermore, with a comprehensive 
view, process safety management can suggest ideal guidelines to their employees so that 
the likelihood of possible incidents will be decreased. Furthermore, during a HAZOP 
meeting, there are too many repetitive tasks, which is tedious for participants and makes 
them less aware of possible scenarios that require more intensive attention. To minimize 
repletion and encourage involvement, this study seeks a semi-automated approach with 
more effective use of HAZID time and more focused attention to critical points.            
 
1.2.2 Practical guidelines  
As shown in Figure 2, process design and engineering with respect to plant and safeguards 
play the most fundamental roles in avoiding adverse events, which can have impacts on 
process safety (Baybutt, 2016b). This study pursues a more practical method to help 
process engineers with process safety designs, even at the initial design stage. Therefore, 
a new tool is expected to help to create an inherently safer design with passive and active 
design safeguards. 
                                                 
categories and some experts assert even that inherently safer design incorporates the meaning of segregation 
and separation.     
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1.2.3 The application of cutting-edge techniques 
Currently, new technologies facilitate the development of safety techniques. To date, new 
technologies developed by other disciplines have mainly supported chemical plant control 
or optimization through, for example, automation and simulation programs. However, it 
is time to apply several cutting-edge technologies designed to enhance safety of the 
process industry. For instance, the commercialized process package, SmartPlant Piping 
and Instrument Diagram® (SP P&ID®) can be applied for better results in the context of 
safety considerations, whereas its primary application is for effective design efforts. 
Additionally, this study will briefly employ other computer science and statistics methods 
and tools, to deal with empirical data for a new HAZID tool.   
 
1.3  Structure of this thesis  
In this study, each chapter is organized and described briefly as follows: 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Basic Concepts 
Prior to introducing a novel HAZID tool, it is crucial to recognize the traditional 
methodologies and state-of-the-art ones, which have both contributed to the development 
of a novel method. Following the classical ones including HAZOP and FMECA, 
particularly taking into account their strengths and weaknesses, current enhanced attempts 
are examined, such as methods that integrate methods related to HAZOP and FME(C)A, 
and semi-automated HAZOP.  Then, brief explanations will be given for data mining and 
Bayesian Network (BN). Since both data mining and BN can support proper data 
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management, they are introduced to be assist with reader comprehension. Finally, 
contributors to previous incidents in the chemical plants will be analyzed.     
 
Chapter 3: The Concepts of Data-based Semi-Automatic Hazard Identification 
The main concepts of the Data-based semi-Automatic HAZID (DAHAZID) are 
introduced in this chapter. In light of the information in Chapter 2, the proposed 
DAHAZID analysis attempts to incorporate multiple factors, from obtaining data to 
suggesting user-friendly, viable worksheets and safeguards. With the proper combination 
of these factors, DAHZID pursues more comprehensive and practical ways. In particular, 
this method attempts to utilize cutting-edge tools, SP P&ID® and SQL, so it suggests a 
new possibility for the current HAZID tools. To help understand which steps should be 
required for the new method, which has a prepopulated worksheet, the last section 
provides an overview of the new method with an overall workflow.  
 
Chapter 4: A Simple Application With The New HAZID  
Prior to conducting an actual case study, this chapter illustrates a simple example, 
grounded in the DAHAZID methodology. Even though data from SQL and SP P&ID® is 
not utilized, this chapter provides the insights for this new method by performing a simple 
case study that might be encountered in the initial design stage.        
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Chapter 5: Boiler Feed Water System Case Study  
This chapter sheds light on the usefulness of the DAHAZID method by dealing with an 
actual process system and its data. By comparing current safety control systems in the 
actualized process, this chapter serves to highlight the potential of this new semi-
automated tool for the following purposes: a detailed engineering stage, periodic PHA, or 
Management of Change (MOC). At the end of this case study, there will be a comparison 
between the DAHAZID analysis and a generic HAZOP study, including their processes 
and outcomes. Based on this comparison, several future works will be suggested in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future work 
This chapter offers the conclusion of this research. The characteristic in the DAHAZID 
methodology is elucidated, mainly with the “trade-off between sophistication and 
simplicity” issue in the new method. Additionally, this chapter allows for the possibilities 
of the DAHAZID, followed by future work and contributions in the current HAZID field.  
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2.  BASIC CONCEPTS FROM LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 1 outlined the direction of this thesis and suggested the three main goals of this 
research. This chapter presents an informative background from which to develop a novel 
HAZID tool. It begins with classical representative HAZID methods followed by 
advanced current methods and other relevant information.   
  
2.1  Classic HAZID methodologies  
For decades, many hazard identification methodologies have been developed and 
proposed to avoid unintentional events throughout industry. Of the following eight 
methods, because of their relevance to this research, Hazard and Operability study 
(HAZOP) and Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) will be examined 
in more detail.  
 
2.1.1 Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP)  
Introduction of HAZOP 
Since the 1970s4’, HAZOP has been the most applied process hazard analysis method in 
the process industry (Pasman, 2015). The purpose of this analysis is to identify possible 
deviations from design intents, as these process deviations might cause undesired events 
(e.g., injuries, fatalities, and catastrophes). Since HAZOP was introduced, the major 
working progress of the method has been maintained: under a facilitator’s guidance, a 
                                                 
4 A brief history of HAZOP is presented in Appendix C.1 
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group of engineers collaborates to identify hazard, develop associated potential failure 
scenarios, and suggest potential safeguards. Appendix C.2 illustrates a generic example of 
a HAZOP study.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. HAZOP progress direction5 (Redmill, Chudleigh, & Catmur, 1999) 
 
 
According to Knowlton (1987), one of the greatest strengths of a HAZOP study is its 
relatively systematic structure (McKelvey, 1988) compared to other conventional analysis 
tools. For example, Figure 3 shows the structure of a HAZOP study consisting of a start 
point and working flows. Firstly, HAZID-engineers undertake this analysis with one 
single deviation, which is made by combining each process variable and guideword 
(shown in Table 8 in Chapter 3). After selecting a single deviation, engineers identify 
                                                 
5 This figure will be used to develop the concept of a new method in Chapter 3.  
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possible causes and consequences. Ideally, all deviations should be applied to simulate all 
conceivable causes and consequences. Additionally, a HAZOP study requires discussion 
among participants (typically experts in individual fields, such as processes, piping, 
mechanics, safety, instruments, and operation), so this working process6 can lead to more 
reliable results.  
 
Regarding the detailed properties of HAZOP, considerable work has been done, as shown 
in Appendix C.3.     
 
Limitations of HAZOP 
Despite its significant strengths, a HAZOP study suffers from several major drawbacks. 
First, the “deviation” that is a key application in HAZOP conversely generates inefficient 
processes and outcomes (Baybutt, 2015b), as shown in Table 2. Namely, many issues in a 
HAZOP study tend to arise due to the deviation, designed to identify possible hazardous 
scenarios systematically. Second, a HAZOP study fails to suggest or review proper 
safeguards thoroughly and consistently. Because the method heavily depends on the 
knowledge or experience of its team members, it is hard to cover all needed safeguards 
after identifying all possible scenarios within a limited time. Third, a HAZOP study does 
not cover the intrinsic mechanical issues, such as straight mechanical failures, suitability 
of materials (Duguid, 1999), and pump sizing (Taylor, 2007). Moreover, this analysis 
                                                 
6 A generic HAZOP procedure is shown in Appendix C.2 
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mainly focuses on the normal process phase except for abnormal cases, such as start-up 
and shut-down (Taylor, 2007). Consequently, critical points related to these abnormal 
situations can be overlooked under a HAZOP guideline. Additionally, a HAZOP study 
cannot deal with a plant layout. Rather than during the meeting, consequence modeling is 
conducted separately, so with respect to its scenarios or consequences, process engineers 
might have less concern about this issue, and it is not easy to connect with other possible 
causes such as domino effects. Finally, as the fundamental limitation related to human 
beings, this analysis requires participants more than their abilities (McKelvey, 1988). 
Under the guidance of a facilitator, people must be familiar with the design intents of the 
process concerned and the principles of HAZOP before the HAZOP meeting. They also 
must overcome problems, such as miscommunication, labor-intensive circumstances, lack 
of knowledge of the possible scenarios, etc. For these reasons, it is noted that a HAZOP 
study is not a complete method to prevent potential incidents even though it has 
contributed to the process industry for decades. 
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Table 2. Limitations associated with “deviation” in a HAZOP study 
No Reason 
1 Difficulty of producing deviations 
2 Requirement of counterintuitive reasoning 
3 Unclear meaning of deviations 
4 
Absence of an actual case  
(e.g., multiple deviations might be reviewed simultaneously, but 
the general principle of HAZOP demands the review of an 
individual deviation)  
5 Repeated deviations and scenarios 
6 Lack of propagations 
7 
Labor-intensive process due to a wide range of deviations 
→ Need to review more significant deviations thoroughly 
    (e.g., low-probability major-consequence hazards ) 
 
 
2.1.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Introduction of FMEA 
In the mid-1960s, FMEA was proposed by NASA for reliability in the aerospace industry 
(Mikulak, McDermott, & Beauregard, 2008). The objective of the FMEA analysis is to 
prevent failure modes in a system ahead of time after identifying possible failure modes 
and their effects (Mikulak et al., 2008; Redmill et al., 1999). In particular, FMEA focuses 
on how individual equipment can fail, so it starts with the failure modes of a piece of 
equipment (expressed here as a single cause) in a system, as shown in Figure 4. With the 
possible failure modes, the FMEA team examines the following consequences for a 
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system, personnel, and the public. Because there are various possible failure modes and 
consequences, this method requires a database compiled through previous experiences or 
brainstorming from expert knowledge.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. FMECA progress direction7 (Redmill et al., 1999) 
 
 
Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
This research separates the two terms, FMEA and FMECA, even though some works use 
them interchangeably. As a qualitative method, FMEA concerns itself with capturing 
reliable, trustworthy data (Goodson, 2016), whereas as an extension method of FMEA, 
FMECA quantitatively pursues a relative ranking to prioritize potential failure modes for 
actions  (Mikulak et al., 2008). Table 3 shows an example procedure of the FMECA.    
                                                 
7 This figure will be used to develop the concept of a new method in Chapter 3. 
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Table 3. Example procedure of FMECA (Mikulak et al., 2008) 
 
 
 
In FMECA, the concept of the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is designed to prioritize 
equipment failure modes to demonstrate the relative ranking of required actions (Mikulak 
et al., 2008). Consequently, we can focus on the more important events by eliminating 
rather trivial cases. The following equation shows a generic calculation used to obtain the 
RPN.      
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𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃 = 𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆) × 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁 (𝑂𝑂) × 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 (𝐷𝐷) 
Equation 1. Generic RPN formulation 
 
 In decision making, the results of Eq.1 enable FMECA teams to reach a consensus, 
although determining for consequence Severity, probability of Occurrence, and 
probability of Detection can be challenging.    
 
Limitations of FME(C)A 
The FMECA functions to examine data exhaustively item by item, rather than seeking a 
broad point of view. However, this method is unsuitable for a process system, because a 
FMECA analysis seeks to identify the intrinsic potential of an individual piece of 
equipment. Moreover, the analysis demands reliable and numerous data, which requires 
accumulating information over a considerable period (performing accurate analyses, 
observations, and judgments of each equipment reliability or failure modes). Thus, it is 
essential to establish a reliable database for proper decision making in an FMECA. 
 
2.1.3 Checklist 
The primary purpose of checklists is to ensure a consensus standard with  practice (CCPS, 
2008; Redmill et al., 1999). The arranged list facilitates hazard identification processes, 
so this method is employed for all process stages.  Redmill et al. (1999) argued that using 
a checklist is the most effective method concerning well-defined process systems. In some 
cases, the checklist method is applied with other HAZID methodologies (e.g., what-
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if/checklist or a hybrid approach with other human evaluation tools) to improve efficiency. 
The major limitation of this method is that checklist analysts are biased by checklists and 
can fail to cover outside the prepared checklists. For this reason, the practice standards 
require further development.  
 
2.1.4 What-if 
To uncover possible causes and consequences of incidents, this analysis involves 
continually asking questions starting with “What-if” in a brainstorming approach (CCPS, 
2008; EPA, 2008). This unstructured approach has both strengths and weaknesses. 
Simply, the what-if method encourages engineers to ask and answer various questions at 
any stage in a project. By answering the questions, the HAZID team can find possible 
hazards and suggest relevant solutions during this process. However, the results of this 
method are mainly dependent on the experience and knowledge of the engineers/analysts.       
 
2.1.5 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
In a deductive manner (backward thinking), an FTA enables the investigation of possible 
scenarios in which hazards result in incidents (Crowl & Louvar, 2001). Starting from a 
well-defined incident (or top event), this analysis requires examining possible causes of 
the incident backward to base events for which failure data are available. Afterward, the 
expected scenario is visualized as a fault tree diagram. After developing a complete fault 
tree, analysts recommend possible safety control systems to prevent the incident. With this 
method, it is easy to understand the causality of incidents with a visualized fault tree and 
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to calculate the possibility of incidents quantitatively (even though it can be hard to obtain 
accurate probability values for base failure events).        
 
2.1.6 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
In an inductive manner (straightforward thinking), an ETA starts with an incident, the top 
event in the FTA, and investigates its possible ultimate outcomes (Crowl & Louvar, 2001). 
This method also graphically represents possible scenarios (with probability estimates), 
so it is easy to recognize final results. Therefore, this method is applied to prepare 
responsible actions in advance for potential incidents (CCPS, 2008).        
 
2.1.7 Bowtie analysis 
Utilizing prepared ETA and ETA outcomes, a bowtie graph is established to visualize 
overall scenarios, from actual initial base failure cases to final outcome results, for any 
incident. Thus, this bowtie consists of the two analysis tools, FTA and ETA, as shown in 
Figure 5. This figure of a generic bowtie shows possible scenarios from FTA and ETA 
and barriers to the risk management system (Swuste, Theunissen, Schmitz, Reniers, & 
Blokland, 2016).  
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Figure 5. Bowtie metaphor including FTA and ETA (Swuste et al., 2016) 
 
 
2.1.8 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
 A Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) evaluates reliabilities associated with human 
performance (e.g., operation, maintenance) in chemical plants (CCPS, 2008). This 
analysis examines the performance with several activity types: human activities 
particularly related to safety issues, categorization of human skills or knowledge, safety 
culture in a company, and environmental factors that increase human error. Because 
human errors are not independent factors, in general, it is suggested that an HRA should 
be performed with other hazard evaluation tools. In addition, quantifying human errors 
with limited and uncertain data that is highly dependent on conditions and other factors is 
challenging.     
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2.2  Integrated HAZOP and FMEA 
 The ultimate goal of any hazard identification tool is to uncover possible incident 
scenarios to prevent or reduce the likelihood of adverse events. However, Redmill et al. 
(1999) pointed out that there is no perfect technique or tool that can identify all possible 
hazards, so combinations of two or more methods should be used to produce more 
effective results. One of the standard combinations is HAZOP and FMEA. Even though 
some people mistakenly consider HAZOP and FMEA similar alternatives, HAZOP and 
FMEA take different approaches and therefore complement each other. Hence, three 
hybrid methods will be examined in order to develop the next step.  
 
2.2.1 Blended Hazard Identification (BLHAZID)  
 Based on a system approach, Functional Systems Framework (FSF), Seligmann (2011) 
and Seligmann et al. (2012) developed an efficient integrated methodology called Blended 
Hazard Identification (BLHAZID). They proposed blending the results of two HAZID 
tools: HAZOP and FMEA. Their heavily computerized method applies a structured 
language that enables the implementation of a system approach, since it has a broad range 
of coverage and holds causality knowledge in triplets. Figure 6 describes the overall 
concept of the BLHAZID analysis with the FSF notion that draws the structure–function–
goal relationships in chemical plants. First, the structure consists of two parts: 
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components 8  (Plant, People, and Procedures) and streams (of information, materials, 
signals reading control systems, and communication among people). Second, the function 
herein is made up of a set of capabilities, and it used to connect the foregoing structures 
for a system goal. Finally, there is a discussion of how to express the process system goal 
in a system.    
 
 
 
Figure 6. HAZID methods viewed in the FSF (Seligmann et al., 2012) 
 
 
                                                 
8 As factors that can cause the failure of a system, the three components, Plant, People, and Procedures (P3), 
were introduced by I.T Cameron, Seligmann, Hangos, Lakner, and Németh (2007), but only the plant aspect 
was dealt with by Seligmann (2011).  
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Moreover, the two different approaches, HAZOP and FMEA, are described as function-
driven analysis and component-driven analysis, respectively, at the bottom of the figure. 
HAZOP seeks to identify possible deviations grounded in process design intents, and 
FMEA serves to identify possible component failure modes. That is, there are 
complementary and overlapping spaces, as shown in Figure 6.  
 
According to Seligmann et al. (2012),  the outcomes of BLHAZID have a broad range of 
coverage with detailed causality knowledge of a system by means of structured languages. 
Associated with all FSF entities in a system, these structure languages9 were developed to 
capture more causality of hazards effectively and consistently. Hence, the results of this 
method might be applied to subsequent tasks, such as training and diagnosis of faults. 
Because the handling of all structured languages is complex, an inference engine was also 
generated. Németh et al. (2011) proposed visualized causal approaches using the structure 
languages.   
 
2.2.2 Process Flow Failure Modes Analysis (PFFM) 
 The work of Ego and MacGregor (2004) and MacGregor (2013) introduced a new 
methodology, Process Flow Failure Modes (PFFM) Analysis, which, in terms of its 
character, lies between HAZOP and FMEA. As the name implies, the aim of PFFM is to 
                                                 
9 BLHAZID has three types of structure languages: general process system, process-specific knowledge, 
and BLHAZID-generated knowledge. In particular, the general process system is similar to the 
HAZOPExpert tool of Vaidhyanathan, Venkatasubramanian, and Dyke (1996), which will be explained in 
Subsection 2.3.2.  
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maximize the guide variable of the process flow, because the way of thinking is similar to 
the reasoning of operating personnel (Ego & MacGregor, 2004). MacGregor (2016) 
claimed that PFFM is a more efficient and straightforward method than a HAZOP study, 
as it encourages participants to be more active during PHA meetings. PFFM can increase 
the completeness of scenario identification significantly. In case studies, more than a 
doubling of the number of scenarios compared with HAZOP has been demonstrated. 
PFFM modified a P&ID and PFD into a more effective process diagram, the so-called 
Safeguard Flow Diagram (SFD), including safety control systems from the PFD but 
deleting irrelevant figures from the P&ID. With the SFD, the team can minimize errors, 
because it is relatively easy to interpret the process of a diagram that indicates different 
colors. The method also makes use of a unique list composed of various failure modes 
regarding process equipment accumulated over the years.  
 
2.2.3 FMECA and HAZOP Integrated Analysis (FHIA)  
The study of Giardina and Morale (2015) suggested FMECA and HAZOP integrated as 
an analysis, FHIA. By means of the RPN in an FMECA analysis, FHIA allows the ranking 
of both human errors and component failures. According to Giardina and Morale, it should 
be noted that this method incorporates human error into the incident occurrence parameter 
in Table 4 for an enhanced RPN. This is needed, because it was difficult for the traditional 
RPN to recognize correlations of incidents and dependencies among equipment and 
human errors (Giardina, Castiglia, & Tomarchio, 2014). Moreover, it was useful to apply 
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HAZOP aspects to identify incident scenarios with the cause–deviation–consequence 
logical structure.  
  
 
Table 4. FMECA scale for the probability of component failures and human errors 
(Giardina & Morale, 2015) 
Component failure occurrence probability 
 (operating day) 
Human error 
occurrence 
probability 
Rank 
Unlikely, unreasonable to 
expect failure to occur <1:20,000 
Less than every 5 
years 1 
Low failure rate 1:20,000 In 3–5 years, 2 
  1:10,000 In 1–3 years 3 
Occasional failures 1:2000 Per year 4 
 1:1000 In 6 months 5 
  1:200 In 3 months 6 
Repeated failures 1:100 Per month 7 
  1:20 Per week 8 
Inevitable failure, almost  1:10 Every few days 9 
   certain to cause problems 1:02 Per day 10 
 
 
 
2.3  HAZOP automation attempts  
Given that this thesis attempts a new semi-automatic hazard analysis, this section reviews 
the overall history of automatic HAZID methods. It is noted that each automatic tool has 
developed to supplement previous versions, such as by making more user-friendly 
conditions and handling a broader range of processes. Therefore, the transitional overview 
of automated HAZID methods will be a worthwhile step toward the proposal of a new 
approach.  
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2.3.1 Faisal I. Khan and S.A. Abbasi et al. (1995-2009) 
As HAZEXPT (F.I Khan & Abbasi, 1995) is the initial step of their models, Khan and his 
coworkers made progress toward a more enhanced semi-automated HAZOP, as presented 
in Figure 7. The authors proposed a HAZOP knowledge-base that consists of “process-
specific” and “process-general” components for hazard identification in HAZEXPT 
(Faisal I Khan & Abbasi, 1997a). Based on the HAZOP knowledge-base, an optimal study 
procedure HAZOP (OptHAZOP) and Tool for optimizing HAZOP (TOPHAZOP) were 
developed in order  (Faisal I Khan & Abbasi, 1997a, 1997b). OptHAZOP attempted to 
eliminate repetitive tasks in a semi-automated HAZOP study, whereas TOPHAZOP 
sought a more enhanced systematic structure that incorporates 1) knowledge-base, 2) 
inference engine, and 3) user interface. Notably, OptHAZOP focuses on generating 
process deviations efficiently by using the interaction between process-general and 
specific aspects within knowledge-base. Faisal I Khan and Abbasi (2000) stressed that 
Expert system for conducting HAZOP (EXPERTOP) contains more knowledge (e.g., 
seven different operations commonly occurred in the chemical process plants) and 
EXPERTOP also has a graphical user interface that enables a user-friendly environment. 
Finally, Rahman, Khan, Veitch, and Amyotte (2009) developed ExpHAZOP+ that 
incorporates “fault propagation algorithm” to identify downstream causes and 
consequences from the recognized upstream events.   
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2.3.2 Venkat Venkatasubramanian et al. (1990-2005) 
Venkatasubramanian and his coworkers progressed more viable HAZOP semi-
automation, as shown in Figure 8. Similarly, they undertook a task to reduce repetitive 
tasks required in a HAZOP meeting and established a knowledge-based framework 
(generic and specific knowledge) at the beginning. Additionally, Venkatasubramanian and 
Vaidhyanathan (1994) considered in HAZOPExpert propagation cases due to deviation of 
a chemical process variable. Then, Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian (1995) 
developed HAZOP-Digraph (HDG) model with two main reasons: 1) to provide a 
graphical infrastructure that represents causality for a user-friendly environment; 2) to 
identify the abnormal causes and consequences that should be added into the diagraph of 
HDG. Subsequently, a semi-quantitative approach that filters and ranks HAZOP results in 
the HDG was proposed, which led to reduction of almost half of the unrealistic scenarios 
of the previous step (Vaidhyanathan & Venkatasubramanian, 1996b). Based on the case 
study of a batch process,  Srinivasan and Venkatasubramanian (1998) established Bath 
ExpertHAZOP with Petri Net that represents tasks in terms of procedural and time-
intervals. Finally, a newly developed software, PHASuite was designed primarily with 
four parts: information sharing, representation, knowledge base, and reasoning engine. 
Furthermore, the notion of “ontology” (as a philosophy origin, Artificial intelligence 
borrows this concept to take account into the subject of existence) was employed to share 
process information and its results with other systems (C. Zhao, Bhushan, & 
Venkatasubramanian, 2005a, 2005b).   
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Figure 7. The semi-automated HAZOP progress by Faisal I.Khan et al. (Ian T. Cameron et al., 2017) 
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Figure 8.  The semi-automated HAZOP progress by V. Venkatasubramanian et al. (Ian T. Cameron et al., 2017) 
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2.3.3 STOPHAZ project (1999-2000) [McCoy  et al., 1999; McCoy  et al., 2000] 
The Layered Digraph Model (LDG) was proposed by Cui, Zhao, Qiu, and Chen (2008).  
As an extension of “non-routine HAZOP analysis”  (Vaidhyanathan & 
Venkatasubramanian, 1996a, 1996b), LDG HAZOP attempts to show all guide words and 
their interactions with three-dimensional modeling; the deviations in the “parent” node (of 
LDG) function to direct the deviations in a “child” node within one workspace. Moreover, 
it is presumably possible to connect with other workspaces. For this reason, the authors 
claim that LDG identifies more scenarios than a conventional HAZOP study. 
Additionally, Cui, Zhao, and Zhang (2010) utilized SP P&ID® to improve the efficiency 
of the LDG HAZOP after extracting process data automatically. Afterward, the same 
group developed CBR-based Analysis(CHA) (J. Zhao, Cui, Zhao, Qiu, & Chen, 2009),  
which is an expert system by learning Case-based Reasoning (CBR). The method employs 
the idea of ontology identically with the approach of PHASuite, so it attempted to have 
the human ability to reason. For example, a new problem is judged by a similarity 
algorithm based on built-in indexes. For this development, the authors borrowed the 
concept of computer-aided process engineering (CAPE) to have a more organized 
structure (e.g., problem/situation, solution, and outcome description).  
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Figure 9. The semi-automated HAZOP progress by Cui and Zhao et al. (Ian T. 
Cameron et al., 2017)  
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2.4  Data management 
2.4.1 Introduction of data mining 
As previously mentioned, it is essential to manage the amount of information, since the 
process industry has become complex. For this reason, we cannot merely rely on unaided 
human brains to deal with the current complex situations. In other words, we are living in 
the information age. In order to judge wisely in this modern world, it is crucial, even for 
the process and safety domains, to process interdisciplinary tasks within the computer 
science domain.  
 
Of the various computer science fields, data mining can contribute to solving issues 
associated with the process and safety industry. The data mining process involves 
discovering precious knowledge from  numerous data sources (Han, Pei, & Kamber, 
2011); enabling people to reveal useable relationships and patterns from original data 
(Sumathi & Sivanandam, 2006), with the mechanism shown in Figure 10. It is therefore 
probable, that data mining capability will reveal hidden process relationships. 
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Figure 10. Typical data mining process (Han et al., 2011) 
 
 
Particularly, with respect to the data mining methodology, Han et al., (2011) propose five 
aspects, one of which is “Boosting the power of discovery in a networked environment.” 
This aspect highlights the mutual connections among most data objects, regardless of 
database relations, the Web, or files. Hence, the interconnection environment of raw data 
can be boosted with semantic links among other data.   
 
2.4.2 Structured Query Language (SQL) 
As a standard computer language, SQL functions to maintain and apply data in “relational” 
databases (Rockoff, 2016). In general, SQL consists of three main elements: Data 
Manipulation Language (DML), Data Definition Language (DDL), and Data Control 
Language (DCL). One of the advantages of SQL is that it has a more natural tendency 
(such as its similarity with declarative language) than other computer languages, such as 
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Basic or C++. Therefore, this similarity enables people to achieve desired tasks more 
efficiently. The SQL language is relatively straightforward, because its data is retrieved 
only from relational databases rather than from entire databases. For example, in the SQL 
language, it is common to have a single statement for the desired target. The representative 
vendors of SQL are Oracle and Microsoft.   
 
2.5  Useful statistical tool  - Bayesian Network  
Although there have been numerous data for independent statistical values (e.g., the 
probability of control valve or pump failure) in the chemical industry, these individual 
numbers are insufficient to predict possible hazards of a complex system. In light of this, 
Bayesian Network (BN) analysis will be suggested. BN is widely used to predict 
conditionally dependent statistical relationships (F. Khan, Rathnayaka, & Ahmed, 2015). 
Currently, the safety field utilizes this approach in applications with other HAZID tools 
or risk assessment tools. In this research, BN analysis will be suggested for future work.  
 
2.6  Design error as a contributor to incidents  
Without the lessons learned from previous incidents, we cannot achieve a more enhanced 
process safety management system. For this reason, this subsection reviews which 
contributors have were identified in the previous chemical process industry incidents.  
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2.6.1 Design errors in the process design lifecycle   
Baybutt (2016b) emphasized “process lifecycle” issues as overlooked in the chemical 
process industry. A standard safety management program (OSHA PSM, 14 elements) and 
a risk-based process safety management program (RMP RBPS, 20 elements) have 
contributed to the process safety field. However, he argued that no program incorporates 
lifecycle issues, one of which is process design errors at the engineering stage, even though 
they can affect incidents significantly.    
 
Definition of design error 
Even though process engineers strive to make satisfactory designs, they can make 
mistakes (Kidam & Hurme, 2012). This is because engineers are human and they typically 
face time pressure during all project stages. Thus, it is almost impossible to create an 
infallible design. 
 
Prior to further analysis, it is necessary to define design error, because it is not 
straightforward. According to Taylor (1975), the definition of “design error” is as follows:  
 
“During analysis of incident records, a design error is deemed to have occurred, if the 
design or operating procedures are changed after an incident has occurred.” 
 
That is, design errors are associated with both design and operating procedures (including 
the operator–technical interface) (Kidam & Hurme, 2012). Based on the definition, it is 
  
36 
 
essential to examine whether there is an underlying correlation between design errors and 
each design phase.  
 
Design errors in process design lifecycle 
Based on their early research indicating that design-related errors are the primary incidents 
in the chemical process industry (Kidam, Hurme, & Hassim, 2010), Kidam and Hurme 
(2012) analyzed design errors occurring in different stages of the process lifecycle by 
utilizing the Failure Knowledge Database (FKD, 2011). They concluded that each design 
phase has different types of design errors, so each stage has unique critical points: 1) R&D 
and preliminary phase: process conditions, chemical reactivity, and incompatibility, 2) 
Basic engineering phase: construction material and layout, and 3) Detailed engineering 
phase: layout and protection system.   
 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of design errors throughout the plant lifecycle (Kidam & 
Hurme, 2012) 
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Figure 11 shows that the basic and detailed engineering phases generated about 55% of 
total design errors. However, the process analysis in the initial stage is critical as well. If 
a proper hazard analysis is carried out in the early process design stage, the combinational 
results can eliminate erroneous process data (Kidam & Hurme, 2012). Conversely, many 
errors in the basic or detailed engineering phase are affected by the R&D or preliminary 
phases because of incorrect design conditions. 
 
Consequently, this subsection offers safer designs for each stage in the chemical process 
industry and insights on how they can be reflected in the new HAZID tool.   
 
2.6.2 Contributions of equipment failure modes to incidents 
Several studies have revealed that “equipment failure” is the factor that contributes most 
to incidents caused by human factors in the chemical process (Kidam & Hurme, 2013; 
Nivolianitou, Konstandinidou, & Michalis, 2006; Prem, Ng, & Mannan, 2010). For 
example, Figure 12 compares the results of Nivolianitou et al. (2006) and Prem et al. 
(2010) in which Major Accident Report System (MARS) data10 and Risk Management 
Plan (RMP) data11 were utilized, respectively. There is no hybrid zone, such as equipment 
failure + human and equipment failure + environment, in the figure, because Prem et al. 
(2010) divided the two aspects roughly into equipment and human. However, it is stressed 
                                                 
10 Investigated period was 1985–2002.  
11 Investigated period was 1994–2009. 
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that the effect of equipment failure accounts for most previous incidents in the chemical 
process industry, and the human aspect takes second place.     
 
 
 
Figure 12. Distribution of contributors to chemical incidents 
 
 
Furthermore, Kidam and Hurme (2013) investigated equipment as contributors to 
chemical process incidents. Using the 364 case data samples from the FKD (2011), they 
mainly analyzed four aspects: 1) distribution of failure equipment and comparison with 
previous analyses, as shown in Figure 13; 2) contributors to equipment accidents, as 
shown in Table 5; 3) main contributor to chemical incidents; and 4) correlations between 
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the main contributors and sub-contributors. Consequently, Kidam and Hurme (2013) 
proposed a “checklist for equipment safety enhancement” enabling the prioritization of 
the more important aspects depending on equipment type.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. Proportions of incidents caused by specific equipment  
(Kidam & Hurme, 2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 13 shows the proportions of incidents caused by specific equipment. Considering 
a domino effect, only the equipment-initiated incidents are counted for in these 
proportions. About one-fourth of the chemical process incidents arose due to piping 
systems. The second most common causes of chemical process incidents were reactors 
and storage tanks, both at 14%, followed by process vessels, heat transfer equipment, and 
separation equipment. The ranking of equipment contributions to incidents provides a 
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reliable estimation, as it is the same method as that used in the analyses of Instone (1989) 
and Marsh Inc (1987), which investigated the petrochemical industry.  
 
 
Table 5. Number and proportion of contributors in equipment related incidents 
(Kidam & Hurme, 2013) 
 
 
 
Additionally, it is noted that on average, 2.2 elements (human related or technical aspects) 
affected each equipment incident, as shown in Table 5. That is, most chemical incidents 
occur when about 2.2 cause aspects are integrated, and the chances of incidents are 
reduced with a single factor. This table points to the correlations with specific contributors 
with each type of equipment. For example, about 33% of previous incidents related to 
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storage tanks occurred because of human/organization factors, which is a relatively big 
portion compared to the others. In this regard, we can prepare measures to avoid repeating 
similar events with storage tanks considering human aspects. Consequently, with this 
useful information, we can focus on individual equipment and its relevant contributors to 
incidents for an enhanced hazard analysis tool.   
 
2.7  Chapter summary  
In order to provide a basic background, this chapter has covered a wide range of topics, 
such as HAZID tools, data mining, and contributors to incidents in the chemical industry. 
By building on classical HAZOP and FMECA, a new HAZID tool will be proposed in the 
following chapter. For this tool, information related to data mining, especially the SQL 
language, and the approach that considers individual equipment for hazard identification 
will be utilized.   
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3.  DATA-BASED SEMI-AUTOMATIC HAZARD IDENTIFICATION – 
THE CONCEPT  
This chapter proposes the Data-based semi-Automatic HAZID analysis for deriving this 
overall insight that will enhance hazard identification with respect to chemical plants. 
 
3.1  Introduction 
“The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” (Bunge, 1979) 
Rather than separating each component of a system, their combination enables people to 
imagine the bigger picture of functioning of an ensemble in the system; this holds in 
general, but certainly for a plant in which components may be connected over relatively 
large distance and in a complex way. For a comprehensive understanding, a critical point 
is deriving the proper connections among linked components of a system from the Piping 
and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) material, based on the fluid direction. Through 
defining and describing these links in the analysis sheets, the limitations of HAZOP and 
FMECA methods will be attenuated. This will also help to reduce the drawback in the 
HAZOP procedure of missing cause-effect relations because of initiating at a deviation 
and having to search back against flow direction for a cause. 
 
3.2  Building stones of the DAHAZID analysis 
Overall, as shown in Figure 14, this study highlights an integrated relationship of the 
following three factors: process data, applications of the relevant data, and proper HAZID 
tools. Keeping in mind that any one factor is not entirely responsible for the prevention 
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and/or protection of possible incidents, the DAHAZID analysis attempts to achieve more 
intertwined research attributes - correlations among process information, previous 
experiences, and appropriate current theories to develop more systematic approaches 
based on lessons learned.   
 
 
 
Figure 14. Conceptual stones of the DAHAZID methodology 
 
 
3.3  Process design condition 
We know that P&IDs and associated process documents serve besides others the 
fundamental role in the process industry of indicating the intended process conditions. 
Process engineers make or develop these documents based on a process design scheme, 
particularly giving more weight to the process perspectives, such as process optimization, 
than to safety aspects. Whenever they perform HAZOP and FMEA, PHA teams review 
the current process designs and the process conditions by employing the multiple 
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documents simultaneously. Because of this multiplicity of documents, consistency in the 
information should avoid confusion and misunderstanding.     
   
However, there are likely to be burdensome aspects in dealing with the multiplicity of 
process papers. Worst of all, humans are prone to errors, so there might be inconsistencies 
among different documents (e.g., the line list and its P&IDs). In addition, it takes 
considerable time to review all data while conducting a HAZID meeting. In general, 
engineers should be ready to open any relevant documents during a HAZOP study and to 
respond to the information, rather than to review incorrect data under time-sensitive 
conditions.   
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3.3.1 Introduction of SP P&ID®   
 
Figure 15. Trade-off between SmartPlant P&ID® and traditional manners 
 
 
Recently, a cutting-edge software, Intergraph’s SmartPlant Piping and Instrumentation 
Diagrams® (SP P&ID®), was commercialized by Intergraph. It not only represents the 
process diagram, like Auto Computer-aided Design (CAD)® P&ID, but also it 
encompasses various data, so it enables the handling of process data and symbols 
simultaneously, as shown in Figure 15. Additionally, there are benefits with SP P&ID® in 
comparison with older packages such as saving time and presence of highly accurate data, 
with SP P&ID® in comparison. Figure 16 and Figure 17 (below) show examples of 
extracted process data through SP P&ID® in a Microsoft EXCEL file.   
(Crowd) 
("Shell and Tube Exchnager 
    
  
(Shaw, 2016) 
(Gränfors, 2015) 
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Figure 16. Parts of piping component list from SP P&ID® 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Parts of instrument list from SP P&ID® 
 
 
Consequently, SP P&ID® can manage a wide range of process data and figures of typical 
P&IDs, so it enables engineers to use the data more effectively. Especially, among these 
data of SP P&ID®, pipeline tag numbers and their directions are used in terms of a 
HAZOP aspect, and process design conditions are used in case of FMECA. The following 
section provides a description of how to use these data properly for the purpose of 
continued hazard identification.  
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3.4  Application of valuable data 
The purpose of this section, associated with the application of data, is twofold: to deal 
with the process data in the HAZID procedure and to make use of accumulated industry 
experiences, especially regarding equipment failure scenarios and safeguards. First, 
interested data can be extracted with the aid of SP P&ID® so that it will help to achieve a 
simpler and more consistent semi-automated analysis. Accumulated industry experiences, 
herein taken from the CCPS book (CCPS, 1998) Guidelines for Design Solutions for 
Process Equipment Failures, will be employed for equipment failure scenarios and 
safeguard recommendations.  
 
3.4.1 Connectivity of a process plant 
To date, in almost all process plants, discrete process documents have conventionally been 
summarized, used and stored as Microsoft EXCEL files, without further data processing. 
In other words, in chemical plants few attempts are made of data mining to deal with their 
process data effectively; only the correctness of each input documentation was satisfied. 
This study, thought, will conduct a data mining operation to extract valuable information 
hidden in the data mass by applying Structured Query Language (SQL) of Microsoft® 
SQL Server 2012. The following subsection explains which data can be mined.  
Our body maintains its health when its organs and physical structures are working properly 
thanks to blood vessels, which make links throughout the whole physical structure. 
Analogously, in the process industry, pipelines might be regarded as the blood vessels of 
chemical plants, since they connect all process components; almost all plant elements have 
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connections with piping and piping components so that an overall process system can be 
recreated based on the links. For this reason, when process engineers make a process 
document for any process component, it is common to report the associated piping 
numbers to designate an accurate location of each item. For instance, Figure 18, which 
shows a part of a Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) data sheet, refers to a pipeline number and 
its size. Generally, all the lists for pipes, equipment, and instruments incorporate piping 
numbers, as shown in Figure 19. Based on this, the piping numbers can be used to 
interconnect the entire process. Consequently, because nearly all process data documents 
involve piping numbers, this study will exploit process piping numbers to connect the 
main process components (equipment, valves, pipelines, devices, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 18. Part of a PSV data sheet 
Adopted from ISA The Instrumentation Systems and Automation Society (1981) 
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Figure 19. Line numbers as a common point  
 
 
Based on the data mining process in Figure 10, the data mining in this study will be 
performed in three steps: data source (e.g. process design condition), data extraction with 
SQL, and data presentation (as prepopulated worksheets that will be explained in 
Subsection 3.5.2). Fortunately, we can save time with SP P&ID®, since the data source 
and data extraction steps can be performed at nearly the same time with the program. For 
example, Figures 16 and 17 can be extracted once people input the process symbol with 
its corresponding data. Moreover, another critical benefit is that the extracted EXCEL file 
contains a flow directions for pipes under the categories “from” and “to” respectively, the 
exact pipe number for each valve, and the inlet or outlet pipes of equipment. This useful 
information is collected in case a P&ID figure is created properly and provided with data.   
 
For reference, albeit pipeline numbers are critical data for this DAHAZID method, it might 
be not necessary to consider whether generic data sheets indicate pipeline numbers in this 
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study. This is because this study will utilize SP P&ID®12 that composes data automatically 
when its figure is drawn. However, this background might be useful, provided that we use 
more traditional data such as a Microsoft EXCEL or PDF file.  Hence, it can be an 
alternative to illustrate this new HAZID method without SP P&ID® by taking into account 
various design conditions.           
 
3.4.2 Safeguards and recommended proper guidelines 
Often, there is a tendency in the chemical industry to separate chemical process and safety 
domains. However, process engineers should identify hazards to result in an inherently 
safer design (including operating procedures) of process plants, while considering 
economic aspects. Some process engineers might overlook the safety considerations, 
believing that it is enough to follow their current project guidelines or industry standards. 
However, these rules or guidelines are not sufficient to minimize potential hazards. As 
many CSB 13  incident investigation reports have found, there are also flaws in the 
recommended practices of the American Petroleum Institute (API), the American Society 
of Mechanical Engineers, and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) (Baybutt, 
2016a), which are regarded as the most credible engineering guidelines. In case safer 
design schemes are not taken into account within initial design processes, numerous extra 
safety measures might be suggested during a HAZOP study, which is conducted at about 
                                                 
12 SP P&ID® might be a cornerstone example of Industry 4.0, which is the current trend of automation and 
data exchange in the manufacturing equipment sector for smart factories (Group, 2013). Taking into account 
this trend phenomenon, this study exclusively describes the strength SP P&ID® in this context. There will 
be more descriptions its strength and weakness in Subsection 6.1.2.  
13 The associated table will be represented in Appendix B  
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the middle of projects.  In addition, however, they might struggle to find the safety issues 
from the HAZOP meeting, which could cause unnecessary economic losses. Therefore, 
safety and process performances are unavoidably dependent. 
 
Generic design solutions 
It is required for engineers to make an appropriate choice among numerous process safety 
designs by taking into account their benefits. According to CCPS (1998), safety system 
designs correspond to one of the following four categories: (1) inherently safer, (2) 
passive, (3) active, and (4) procedural. As mentioned in Section 1.1.2, proper safety 
system design is fundamental to reduce potential adverse events. Figure 20 presents an 
approximated comparison regarding expenses and the complexity of each safeguard. 
Because it is impossible to install all potential safe guards, for safeguard solutions, process 
safety design engineers must balance effectiveness, complexity/ reliability, and cost. In 
other words, process engineers should seek a safer system by properly taking into account 
at the same time their own circumstances, such as their cost benefits and regulations.  
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Figure 20. Comparison of cost and functional attributes for design categories 
(CCPS, 2008) 
  
 
Crowl and Louvar (2001) provided the definitions and examples of the four design 
solutions in Table 6. There are often overlaps between the inherently safer and passive 
design solutions. Consequently, this study will integrate these categories into one solution 
(CCPS, 1998) when the proper guidelines are outlined in the next section.  
 
Of the components shown in Figure 2. Hierarchy of safeguard in Chapter 1, the last two, 
but nevertheless critical safeguards, PPE and emergency response, are not covered by this 
study. 
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Table 6. The four design solutions (Crowl & Louvar, 2001) 
Design 
Solution Definition Example  
Inherently 
Safer14 
To eliminate or mitigate hazards with less 
hazardous conditions or materials 
Compatibility between heat 
exchanger and process fluid 
Passive 
To add safety features that do not require 
action from any devices.  
The associated devices are unrelated to 
process variables. 
Double tube-shell 
construction 
Active To add active safety features depending on process variables Installation of a PSV 
Procedural  To require a person from performing an action to prevent potential incidents 
Periodic sampling of a low-
pressure fluid 
 
 
Guidelines for failure scenarios and design solutions  
To date, many engineers depend on personal experiences regarding failure modes and safe 
design solutions. However, we should expect to have more reliable solutions using 
guidelines from the accumulated experiences of a myriad of process experts, rather than 
just relying on our relatively unsupported intuition. Moreover, provided that the guidelines 
are clear to follow, the expected actions for process safety can be coherent across the 
process industry. This aspect might also influence young engineers to grasp process safety 
concepts without restrictive difficulty. CCPS (1998) introduced the equipment failure 
modes and their safety design solutions, (inherently, passive, active, procedural) for ten 
                                                 
14 Crowl and Louvar (2001) gives four approaches for an inherently safer design: minimize, substitute, 
moderate and simplify 
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equipment types15. Since the guideline includes nearly every component required in the 
chemical industry, it would be useful to apply safer designs based on expected failure 
modes. Of course, companies can customize this guideline by suggesting modifications to 
it or updating.  
 
For example, it is assumed that level controls on a vessel fail when the vessel sustains a 
low level, compared to the normal operation condition. Thus, according to CCPS (1998), 
we can determine the potential design solutions, as provided in Table 7, as part of sixty-
one failure scenarios for a vessel. To this regards, in a study after stimulating our 
imagination by assuming operational deviation, we first we have to select equipment 
failure modes according to the CCPS (1998) reference. Next, depending on the expected 
vessel failure modes, process engineers can select safeguard solutions from among the 
sixty-one cases. Once engineers/analysts have identified a relevant failure scenario, the 
guideline suggests corresponding recommendations for designing a newly suggested 
measure and information for reviewing current process designs. For the DAHAZID 
analysis, the guidelines will serve to make viable a new, semi-automated HAZOP.   
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Vessel, reactors, mass transfer equipment, heat transfer equipment, dryers, fluid transfer equipment, solid-
fluid separators, solids handling and processing equipment, fired equipment and piping and piping 
components.  
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Table 7. Example design solutions for vessel (CCPS, 1998) 
Equipment :Vessel 
No. Operational  Deviations  
Failure 
Scenarios 
Potential design solutions 
Inherently 
Safer/Passive Active Procedural 
45 Low Level Level 
control 
failure 
• Locate underflow
nozzle to maintain   
a minimum liquid
level in the vessel
• Low level alarm
with shutoff
preventing further
liquid withdrawal
from vessel via
either pump
shutdown or
closure of block
valve
• Manual
shutoff
on low
level
indication
3.5  A new semi-automated hazard identification method 
By suggesting HAZOP and FMECA prepopulated worksheets, this section employs a 
hybrid HAZID approach applying HAZOP and FMECA attributes in conjunction with 
previous steps. Because HAZOP is incapable of predicting an inherent failure mode of a 
process component, it is necessary to compensate this insufficient knowledge with 
FMECA. In this sense, the DAHAZID analysis integrates the two HAZID tools, HAZOP 
and FMECA; by making use of the system connectivity in Section 3.4.1, the DAHAZID 
tool enables the determination of possible causes and consequences in a system with the 
HAZOP perspective. Meanwhile, with the FMECA attribute, the new tool weighs the 
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possible failure mode associated with the particular environment of a system, problems 
intrinsic to each piece of equipment, and human errors. 
Figure 21. Working directions of DAHAZID methodology 
Derived and combined from Figures 3 and 4, Figure 21 shows the overall workflow of the 
DAHAZID methodology. The navy-blue and red-arrows present HAZOP and FMEA 
attributes, respectively. Regarding the HAZOP attribute, the significant characteristics of 
this method are to have a clear starting point (one reference equipment) and only one 
single guide parameter (flow) for possible causes. Following that one equipment is 
designated as a reference equipment, analysts can easily imagine possible scenarios 
merely by considering no, less, or more flow for possible causes. Meanwhile, FMECA 
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functions to review the failure modes of each piece of equipment and potential effects, 
including their Failure Probability Failure Modes (FPFD) to obtain a quantitative 
indication. To support effectively these notions, the DAHAZID analysis utilizes the 
following “prepopulated worksheets” that take advantage of HAZOP and FMECA. 
3.5.1 Failure scenarios associated with HAZOP attributes 
Pre-requisite condition and aim 
Based on the piping connectivity with fluid directions in Subsection 3.4.1, a prepopulated 
worksheet will be introduced to achieve a semi-automated analysis. For a reliable result, 
a HAZOP study requires proper guidelines under the leadership of a skilled HAZOP 
facilitator (MacGregor, 2013). That is, it is an uncommon occurrence to prepare a HAZOP 
without a facilitator in advance. Additionally, even in the HAZOP studies with experts, 
their outcomes are always non-identical. However, this HAZOP attribute that worksheet 
proposed here generates directions to engineers implicitly with respect to identification of 
possible causes and consequences. This aspect prompts a self-directed study and triggers 
more discussions among engineers, which will lead to review hazardous scenarios more 
thoroughly and to save time for a HAZOP review meeting. Consequently, the following 
sections explain how to create the pre-populated worksheet.  
Workflow with fluid directions 
As mentioned above, the HAZOP attribute worksheet in DAHAZID examines one process 
parameter, flow, regarding possible causes. The strength of this approach is to use 
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straightforward thinking alongside theses flow directions, whereas the main drawback in 
a HAZOP study is counterintuitive brainstorming from deviation to cause upstream and 
to effect downstream. In a theory, during a HAZOP meeting, a HAZOP team following 
from a combination of a process variable and guide word, as shown in Table 8; to find all 
deviations, participants should match multiple process parameters with guide words. Yet, 
this process raises several issues. First, it is cumbersome to apply combined simultaneous 
deviations (typical deviations are shown in Table 8). Second, the required thinking in 
HAZOP is counterintuitive, because we must find possible causes for a proposed 
deviation. That is, this step as already mentioned requires backward thinking (Baybutt, 
2015b; MacGregor, 2013). Alongside the combination of a process variable and 
guideword, the way of thinking is not aligned with common sense and the backward 
thinking does not lead to identifying all causality. In contrast, there will be more 
opportunities to review all possibilities clearly, if the study is conducted in a natural 
sequence. For these reasons, the DAHAZID analysis seeks a more visible workflow along 
the fluid direction of a system.     
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Table 8. HAZOP deviation matrix (Crawley & Tyler, 2015) 
Reasons for the fundamental variable, flow 
There are two main reasons this study chooses flow as a fundamental parameter for a 
system. First, similar to pipelines, the flow has connections with other process variables, 
such as temperature, pressure, and level. For example, the low flow of an inlet line brings 
about a low level for a vessel, or conversely the low flow of an outlet line can generate a 
high level for a vessel. Additionally, if more flowrate goes through hot-side of a heat 
exchanger, the temperature of the opposite side (cold-side) in the heat exchanger will be 
higher than design intent. In other words, flow is likely to propagate fault and to influence 
other process variables. Furthermore, it is convenient to have a simpler approach along 
the flow direction. Rather than reviewing all process variables regarding possible causes, 
it is much easier to examine possible causes that are likely to occur hazardous 
consequences. For example, with this new method, we are only required to review the 
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possibilities of no flow, less flow, and more flow on each item, which will be indicated on 
the prepopulated worksheets.   
 
In case of mixtures partial flow rates of components shall be tracked. 
 
Another factor to consider with flow, fluid type 
It is noted that every fluid has its own properties and may therefore exhibit different 
phenomena under the same conditions. For instance, at the same pressure and temperature, 
water and steam have different physical properties even though they have identical 
chemical structure. Assuming one inlet line for steam supply is blocked, by cooling the 
line might result in a vacuum state, which does not occur in a water supply line. 
Consequently, it is also necessary to review potential scenarios regarding fluid type under 
operational conditions.         
 
Prepopulated worksheets for the HAZOP aspect 
The starting point of this method is one item of static or rotating equipment, herein named 
as reference equipment, and possible incident causes or consequences would connect with 
the equipment given in the directions of flow. Based on the notion, by making use of SQL 
language, this research proposes to create prepopulated worksheets along two approaches, 
path 1 and path 2, respectively. Microsoft SQL Server 2012®16 is applied to sort the 
                                                 
16  Amol Jayant Bansod, an IT student staff of MKOPSC, made the relevant codes with the SQL program 
based on this paper’s notion.   
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possible cause items in paths 1 and 2; path 1 contains potential failure causes on inlet lines 
from a reference equipment, whereas path 2 predicts potential causes on outlet line 
problems of the reference equipment. In accordance with the worksheets, we can perform 
a semi-automated HAZOP based on the previous two prerequisites, only flow as a possible 
primary deviation and on recognizing fluid characteristics. Figure 22 represents how this 
research leads to HAZOP worksheets. In Figure 22 and Figure 23, cells starting “#” mean 
that the cell will be filled with SQL coding to construct a prepopulated worksheet. Then, 
the yellow empty column under “Check” must be reviewed by HAZID process engineers. 
In the spreadsheet, as expected, other variables such as level appear as a consequence. 
Once failure scenarios are selected, the corresponding safeguards can be suggested from 
accumulated experience (e.g., CCPS, 1998) 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Sample guideline for prepopulated HAZOP worksheet 
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3.5.2 Failure scenarios associated with FMECA attributes 
Regarding the failure mode of each item in a plant, FMECA is important in the 
methodology for identifying causality. HAZOP does not take account of failure modes of 
an individual item, but FMECA represents equipment designs and potential faults of each 
component. Thus, including and utilizing the FMECA features, the new tool generates 
failure modes of each equipment.  
 
 
 
Figure 23. Sample guideline for prepopulated FMECA worksheet 
 
 
Figure 23 illustrates a sample prepopulated FMECA worksheet, which is composed of two 
types of data, process data, and Failure Probability Failure Mode (FPFM). Analogous to 
the previous prepopulated HAZOP worksheet, we can acquire process design data with 
the aid of SP P&ID®  and SQL, and we also add FPFM, which can be borrowed from 
authorized data sources (e.g., the CCPS (1989) reliability handbook, or the databases of 
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HSE (2012) or OREDA (2015)). For more enhanced predictions of equipment reliability 
and failure modes, it is essential to seek practical data analysis methods, which minimize 
laborious tasks and maximize accuracy of the analysis. Also, other possible failure causes 
(such as environment and human error) must be considered as well as how to reduce and 
identify them.   
 
 
3.6  Overall workflow of new HAZID 
 
Figure 24. Workflow diagram of DAHAZID analysis 
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Figure 24 shows the overall workflow of the development of the DAHAZID method with 
an on-going and a future part, while within the on-going part the actual work process is 
shown as followed here. Because of the several steps and the application of supporting 
technologies, it seems rather complex. The on-going part develops as shown in this paper; 
the proposed next steps will still take a further effort. However, the result will be in a new 
semi-automated HAZID, DAHAZID, in which an HAZID-team will obtain the 
information in a more convenient and consistent way, so that the team can focus on the 
essentials of identifying and defining scenarios and is not delayed by fuzzy information 
deficiencies. Once this development is completed, the achievement of safer process 
designs can be expected in a more time-efficient way.    
 
3.7  Chapter summary 
Taken together, this chapter illustrates how DAHAZID analysis results in a more effective 
HAZID tool based on prepopulated worksheets.  In contrast to traditional HAZID 
methods, it is relatively easy to predict possible scenarios and suggest safeguards 
consistently employing a new approach. That can be helpful for engineers facing time 
pressures and potentially missing scenarios. To demonstrate the potential of the superior 
HAZID tool, the following chapters will show simple case studies.   
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4.  A NEW METHODOLOGY – A SIMPLE APPLICATION  
Prior to undertaking an actual case study, this chapter illustrates a simple application of 
how this new method can be useful without any SP P&ID®, especially for the initial design 
stage.  
 
4.1  Simple case study using HAZOP attributes in DAHAZID 
4.1.1 Making connections with pipelines 
Based on a simple process diagram, as in Figure 25, which could be encountered in the 
basic design stage, an application of the new method will be performed. Because this 
diagram does not contain any safety device as an initial stage design, the new method will 
be used to identify possible hazardous scenarios and suggest corresponding safeguards.   
 
 
Figure 25. Simple process diagram  
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Firstly, it is essential to assign pipeline numbers and equipment item tags, as shown in 
Figure 25. To avoid confusion, simple Arabic numbers are assigned to pipeline numbers, 
such as 1, 2, and 3, whereas actual pipeline numbers incorporate a variety of information17. 
Then, we can acquire the connection alongside the fluid (or pipeline) direction of the 
simple diagram in Figure 25: Piping No. 1 →LV-001→ piping No. 1→V-001 → Piping 
No. 2 → P-001→Piping No. 3. In an actual case study in the next chapter, this connection 
will be obtained with the aid of SP P&ID® and the SQL language. 
 
4.1.2 Prepopulated worksheet 
Once the item tag numbers are marked and their connections are extracted, it is first 
necessary to select one reference item, here, we use “V-001” for this purpose.   
 
 
Table 9. Expected HAZOP worksheet from SQL code 
 
 
                                                 
17 In general, pipeline numbers include the following details: process unit, process fluid, piping materials 
and their size, types of insulation, etc. 
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After selecting the reference equipment, it is time to employ the DAHAZID analysis with 
a prepopulating worksheet, such as shown in Table 9, which is obtained automatically 
from the SQL code18. At this stage, it is necessary to fill in the light yellowish space in 
Table 9, and its outcome can be Table 10. The purpose of this worksheet is to readily 
stimulate our imagination regarding whether there are unintended events occurring as a 
consequence of 1) possible suggested cause items and 2) deviations of process variable, 
flow, for possible causes, such as “No or Less Flow.”  
 
 
Table 10. Simple study of the process diagram of Figure 25 
 
The abbreviations in Table 10 are NF (No Flow), LL (Low Level), LF (Less Flow) and HL (High Level)  
 
 
                                                 
18 Although this worksheet was prepared by adapting Figure 18, we can modify this worksheet if there is 
something to improve it. Additionally, Microsoft SQL Server 2012® will be applied to sort the possible 
cause items into two approaches, option 1 and option 2, in an actual case study. However, the anticipated 
information is inserted manually this time.   
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It is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by the identification of possible 
scenarios with path 1 and path 2. Firstly, the inlet line of path 1 in Table 10 consists of 
two process components, a control valve (LV-001) and pipeline (No. 1), so these 
components are possible cause items. For instance, there might be some problems with 
the piping, such as a leak of from piping no. 1, or a failed operation mode of the control 
valve, LV-001, so either case can have an accidental impact, (e.g., low level) on the vessel. 
In addition, the anticipated event might influence the downstream equipment, P-001. 
Similarly, the anticipated process items of path 2 that start from a reference item 
downstream might result in any impact on the reference equipment or other downstream 
equipment. Because of the no/less flow on the pump, P-001, in Figure 25, the level of the 
vessel, V-001, is expected to increase due to the unintended event.  
 
4.1.3 Selection of proper safeguards 
By making use of CCPS (1998), we can propose safeguards for any equipment failure 
mode, based on possible scenarios. For example, Table 11 shows the verification of three 
potential failure scenarios followed by the suggestion of proper safeguards. One of the 
three failure scenarios is Low Level on the vessel, V-003, and the description in Table 
3/No.4 at CCPS (1998) corresponds with the failure scenarios.   
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Table 11. Simple example of HAZOP attribute with safeguards  
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Figure 26. Design safety process devices with safeguards
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For the enlarged safeguards in Table 11, Figure 26 shows the types of suggested 
safeguards and how they might be applied. Of the multiple safeguards, this study selects 
six recommendations, which are marked A to F and applied to the previous simple 
diagram.  
 
4.2  Simple case study using FMECA attributes in DAHAZID 
To propose the FMECA function, Table 12 shows a simple example, especially focusing 
on FPFM for which data were borrowed from OREDA (2015). OREDA (2015) shows the 
reliability data, including the percentage of observed multiple failure modes, so that the 
possibilities of environmental impacts are also calculated in Table 12. It is based upon 
probability of environmental impacts if there is an external leakage from process 
equipment. 
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Table 12.  Simple example of FMECA Attributes 
 
    Reliability data is adopted from OREDA (2015) 
Subsystem :
Item Tag Description Reliability 1)
Fail to close 
on demand
Fail to open 
on demand Environ. Human Error Possible impacts on Check
Impacts on 
Environ.
[per 106 hrs.]
Check
LV-001
Valves-operated-
pneumatic 38.03 - 19.02 All V-001 -
Based on the calendar time, 
the mean values of all failure 
modes are selected.
V-001 Vessel 26.85 - - Normal P-001 -
Based on the calendar time, 
the mean values of all failure 
modes are selected.
P-001 Centrifugal pump 114.66 - - all phases other sub-system -
Based on the calendar time, 
the mean values of all failure 
modes are selected.
ConsequenceComponent Failure Probability Failure Mode [per 106 hrs.]
Operating 
phase Note
FMECA
A simple diagram
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4.3  Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the progress of the DAHAZID analysis with a simple diagram. The 
data, included in prepopulated worksheets, were manually filled because the process 
diagram indeed is simple. However, it is believed that the findings offer insights into the 
potential of the DAHAZID tool at the initial stage of a project. The following chapter 
examines an existing process to evaluate the tool’s potential after the design stages have 
been done or even start-up has occurred.   
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5.  BOILER FEED WATER (BFW) SYSTEM CASE STUDY  
This chapter presents how to perform a case study for a Boiler Feed Water (BFW) system 
with the DAHAZID analysis. It might seem that this case study mainly depend HAZOP 
attributes because of their page length compared to FMECA, but it is important to note 
that both approaches are indispensable in the DAHAZID method for a more 
comprehensive identification.      
 
5.1  Process description (BFW system) 
At chemical plants, the BFW package was designed to supply adequate BFW with high-
quality water without impurities that can cause corrosion. This system consists of three 
types of equipment: a deaerator, a BFW pump, and a preheater, as shown in Figures 27 
and 28. The recovered condensate and demineralized water pass the stripping section of a 
deaerator, in which they are mixed with low-pressure steam to strip out non-condensable 
gases from the water. The type of deaerator is a spray tray, and the downstream of the 
deaerator is dosed with a chemical19 to prevent BFW corrosion and oxygen scavengers.     
 
                                                 
19 This is outside the scope of this study.  
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Figure 27. SP P&ID® figure for case study (BFW supply system) (1/2) 
V-003 
P&ID No. 4106 
From E-003 
* Legend DMW (Demineralized Water) BFW (Boiler Feed Water) LP-SCW (Condensate water) LP (Low pressure steam) CHL (Chemical) WW (Cleaned Waste Water) 
 
DMW   
From other subsystem 
From other subsystem From other subsystem 
LP 
BFW  
To P-004 
No.4107 
LP-SCW HEADER  
LP-SCW 
CHL Injection system 
CHL 
No.4107 
LP HEADER 
WW HEADER 
WW 
To other subsystem 
PCV (Pressure Control Valve) LCV (Level Control Valve) TCV (Temperature Control Valve) XV (shut-off valve) PSV (Pressure Safety Valve) 
 
 
VB 
3111A  
VB 
3111B  
 
LCV 
3111 
 
PCV 
3111 
 
LCV 
3117 
 
PSV 
3111   
PSV 
3112 
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Figure 28. SP P&ID® figure for case study (BFW supply system) (2/2) 
P-004 
E-003 
P&ID No. 4107 
BFW  
From V-003 
DMW   BFW 
BFW Header 
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5.2  Step 1:  Application of HAZOP attributes in DAHAZID 
To set up the new HAZID system, a semi-automated preparation stage is needed. Without 
explanation it might be difficult to understand and follow how the complete preparation 
stage evolves. Figure 29 serves to elucidate the process with a flowchart taking the current 
BFW system as an example. In this figure there are three partial preparation step 
categories: 1) Ref. EQ., 2) Fault Scenarios, and 3) the HAZOP attribute study. Ref. EQ 
means selecting one of the four existing types of equipment as reference equipment 
(vessel, valve, pump, heat exchanger), Fault scenarios means developing proper SQL 
codes for possible failure scenarios, and HAZOP attribute study means preparing 
prepopulated HAZOP-attribute worksheets. Figure 29 shows that that there are sixteen 
combinations, so that sixteen worksheets shall be prepared for this case study. For 
instance, E-003 (of Ref. EQ.) matches with SQL HAZOP-path 1 outcome (of Fault 
scenarios) and No/Less flow as possible causes (of HAZOP attribute study). This shall be 
done for all sixteen combinations. This progress is continually maintained until the end of 
all sixteen combinations.   
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Figure 29. HAZOP-attribute progress for prepopulated worksheet (BFW System)  
 
5.2.1 Case of reference equipment :  Heat Exchanger  
Once the SQL language codes are ready for HAZOP path 1 and path 2, we can equally 
and promptly apply these codes to all equipment in the process system. As an example, 
Figures 30 and 31 represent the current SQL codes and their results for paths 1 and 2, 
respectively, when the heat exchanger, E-003 in Figure 28, is selected as reference 
equipment. The other types of equipment will also perform this function in the study on 
the SQL codes so that we can acquire different corresponding results. Once we input one 
selected equipment item tag in the system concerned, we can readily encounter equipment 
or other units that are connected to the selected equipment. Afterward, the outcomes are 
employed for creating a prepopulated work sheet, such as that presented in Table 13.      
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Example of the SQL language and its outcomes for HAZOP attributes
 
Figure 30. SQL Coding of heat exchanger, E-003, for HAZOP path 1 and its result 
 
 
The SQL outcomes for path 1 consist of the following nine types, each represented in an 
Excel sheet column:   
1) Other inlet system: Starting from a reference item, if its inlet lines connect with 
other sub-unit systems, these upstream systems (e.g., HEADER or supply system) 
are shown in the SQL output. Then, a possible cause of unintended process 
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flowrate events is considered. This step is followed to examine fault-propagated 
impacts in the concerned system. 
2) Inlet line: Based on a reference item, its inlet pipeline numbers are extracted to 
designate the pipeline as a possible cause of unintended process flowrate events, 
e.g., by leakage.   
3) Fluid: From point 2) inlet line numbers, the fluid type that passes through the 
pipeline is extracted as a possible cause of unintended process flowrate events.   
4) Faulty valve: Valves on the inlet lines of reference items might disturb the 
flowrate against the design intention, so faulty valve is regarded as a possible cause 
of unintended process flowrate events.  
5) Valve type: To review design adequacy, the types of previous point 4) faulty 
valves are extracted as a possible cause of unintended process flowrate events.  
6) Reference equipment: Following the identification of potential scenarios due to 
previous possible causes, possible consequences (or impacts) on reference 
equipment can be explored. Regarding possible consequences, the type of process 
variable to consider, e.g., flow, level, or temperature, is not restricted.     
7) Outlet line: Similar to point 6) Reference equipment, this is extracted to review 
the possible consequences (or impacts) on outlet lines of the reference equipment. 
8) Downstream equipment: Similar to point 6) Reference equipment, this is 
extracted to review the possible consequences (or impacts) on equipment 
downstream of the reference equipment. In other words, this step is followed to 
examine fault propagation.  
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9) Other outlet system:  Similar to point 6) Reference equipment, this is extracted 
to review the possible consequences (or impacts) on other downstream (sub-) 
systems that link to the reference equipment. This step is also followed to 
examine fault propagation to those other downstream systems. 
 
 
Figure 31. SQL coding of heat exchanger, E-003, for HAZOP path 2 and its result 
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As before in Figure 30, Figure 31 represents how the SQL code retrieves data for HAZOP-
path 220 in case the heat exchanger, E-003, is a reference item. The SQL outcomes for 
path 2 consist of the following nine classifications:   
1) Outlet line: If outlet lines of the reference equipment generate unintended process 
flowrate events, any undesired consequence could have occurred on the reference 
equipment. Therefore, outlet line is regarded as a possible cause item.  
2) Fluid: From point 1) outlet line numbers, the fluid type that passes through the 
pipeline is extracted as a possible cause of unintended process flowrate events. 
3) Downstream Equipment: This represents the equipment downstream of the 
reference equipment. If downstream equipment generates unintended process 
flowrate events, any undesired consequences can directly involve the reference 
equipment. Therefore, equipment is regarded as a possible cause item.  
4) Faulty valve: This represents the downstream control valves of the reference 
equipment. If unintended process flowrate events occur because of the downstream 
valves, any undesired consequences can directly involve the reference equipment. 
Therefore, faulty valve is regarded as a possible cause item. 
5) Valve type: To review design adequacy, the types of valves in outlet lines as in 
previous point 4) are extracted as a possible cause of unintended process flowrate 
events. 
                                                 
20 The primary function of the path 2 in the HAZOP attribute is to guide ‘backward thinking.’  
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6) Reference equipment: Following the identification of potential scenarios due to 
previous possible causes, possible consequences (or impacts) on reference 
equipment can be explored. Regarding possible consequences, types of process 
variables to consider, e.g., flow, level, or temperature, are not restricted.     
7) Other outlet pipe line: This is extracted to review possible consequences (or 
impacts) on the outlet lines due to events at point 3) equipment (not reference 
equipment). This column is prepared to analyze further propagated fault impacts.  
8) Other downstream equipment: This is extracted to review possible 
consequences (or impacts) due to events at point 3) equipment (not reference 
equipment) on other equipment downstream. This column is prepared to analyze 
further propagated fault effects on downstream equipment in series linked with the 
reference piece of equipment.     
9) Other systems: If other subsystems link to the downstream equipment of point 8), 
those other systems are extracted to review possible consequences (or impacts). 
As an expected ultimate propagated state, a column would be helpful to guide 
possible fault propagations. 
 
Conducted HAZOP paths 1 and 2 (Reference EQ: Heat exchanger, E-003)  
Following the preparation of prepopulated worksheets as output from previous SQL 
coding21, the next step is to conduct an HAZOP-attribute study, as shown in Table 13 (Ref. 
                                                 
21 The used SQL code listings will be displayed in Appendix D. 
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EQ: heat exchanger, No/less flow, HAZOP-attribute-path 1 study). Under the “Check” 
column, the red letters indicate possible causes or consequences associated with undesired 
failure conditions. Regarding “verification” or “safeguards,” relevant recommendations 
of these are taken and possibly adapted from CCPS (1998), while the bold letters 
emphasize the existing safeguards in accordance with the recommended ones. 
Furthermore, the blue letters show a case where there is room to modify the 
recommendations from  CCPS (1998). 
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Table 13. (Ref. EQ: heat exchanger, no/less flow) HAZOP-attribute-paths 1 & 2 
 
The abbreviations in Table 13 are NF (No Flow), LF (Less Flow), LP (Low pressure), LL (Low Level) BFW (Boiler Feed Water), DMW (Demineralized 
Water), ARV (Automatic Recirculation Valve), FV (Flowrate Valve), TIC (Temperature Indicate Control), F.V. (Full Vacuum). Regarding safeguards, 
different types of safeguards were assigned with different numbers: 1) Inherently Safer/Passive, 2) Active, and 3) Procedural.   
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Table 13. Continued 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. (Ref. EQ: heat exchanger, more flow) HAZOP-attribute-paths 1 & 2  
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The abbreviations in Table 14 are MF (More Flow), FV (Flowrate Valve), and LCV (Level Control Valve). 
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5.2.2 Case of reference equipment : Vessel  
The method for a vessel is identical to the previous approach. Although this chapter 
introduces the case for a vessel as a second item, it is recommended that vessels (or 
reactors) are reviewed first. This is because they are mostly connected with other rotating 
equipment (e.g., pumps or compressors) and associated with rather complex processes that 
require consideration of various factors. For this reason, the possible scenarios and 
safeguards of vessels are nearly all associated with other equipment or systems, so the 
case where vessels are selected first helps to prevent same tasks from being repeated.      
 
 
Figure 32. SQL results of vessel, V-003, for HAZOP 
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Table 15. (Ref. EQ: vessel, no/less flow) HAZOP-attribute-path 1  
 
The abbreviations in Tables 15 are NF (No Flow), LF (Less Flow), LP (Low pressure), LL (Low Level) ME (Mechanical Sensor), LAL (Level Alarm Low)  
LALL (Level Alarm Low Low)  LI (Level Indicator), LP-SCW(Condensate Low Pressure Clean)  SP (Safety Point), PSD ( Pressure Shutdown) AAH (Analysis 
Alarm High), AAL (Analysis Alarm Low), WC (Wrong Composition). Regarding safeguards, different types of safeguards were assigned with different 
numbers: 1) Inherently Safer/Passive, 2) Active, and 3) Procedural.   
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Table 15. Continued 
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Table 16. (Ref. EQ: vessel, no/less flow) HAZOP-attribute-path 2  
 
The abbreviations in Table 16 are NF (No Flow), LF (Less Flow), LP (Low pressure), HL (High Level), LAL (Level Alarm Low), LALL (Level Alarm Low 
Low) LCV (Level Control Valve), and HT (High Temperature). Regarding safeguards, different types of safeguards were assigned with different numbers: 1) 
Inherently Safer/Passive, 2) Active, and 3) Procedural.   
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Table 17. (Ref. EQ: vessel, more flow) HAZOP-attribute-paths 1 & 2  
 
The abbreviations in Table 17 are MF (More Flow) and HL (High Level). The abbreviations in Table 20 are MF (More Flow), HL (High Level), HP (High 
Pressure), PCV (Pressure Control Valve), FO (Flow Orifice), PSV (Pressure Safety Valve), and PAH (Pressure Alarm High). Regarding safeguards, different 
types of safeguards were assigned with different numbers: 1) Inherently Safer/Passive, 2) Active, and 3) Procedural.     
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Table 17. Continued 
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5.2.3 Case of reference equipment : Pump 
Figure 33. SQL results of pump, P-004, for HAZOP 
This section has an exclusive case study for a pump, except for the pump turbine, the case 
study of which will follow.   
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Table 18. (Ref. EQ: pump, no/less flow) HAZOP-attribute-paths 1 & 2  
 
The abbreviations in Table 18 are NF (No Flow), SP (Safety Point), AAH (Analysis Alarm High), and AAL (Analysis Alarm Low). Regarding safeguards, 
different types of safeguards were assigned with different numbers: 1) Inherently Safer/Passive, 2) Active, and 3) Procedural.   
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Table 19. (Ref. EQ: pump, more flow) HAZOP-attribute-paths 1 & 2 
 
The abbreviation in Table 19 is MF (More Flow). 
 
 
97 
5.2.4 Case of reference equipment :  Pump Turbine 
Figure 34. SQL results of pump turbine, P-004-T, for HAZOP 
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Table 20. (Ref. EQ: pump turbine, no/less flow) HAZOP-attribute-paths 1 & 2  
 
The abbreviations in Table 20 are NF (No Flow), SP (Safety Point), AAH (Analysis Alarm High), and AAL (Analysis Alarm Low). Regarding safeguards, 
different types of safeguards were assigned with different numbers: 1) Inherently Safer/Passive, 2) Active, and 3) Procedural.   
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Table 21. (Ref. EQ: pump turbine, more flow) HAZOP-attribute-paths 1 & 2 
 
The abbreviations in Table 21 are SM (Steam Medium Pressure), and SL (Steam Low Pressure).  
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5.3  Step 2:  Application of FMECA attributes in DAHAZID 
The FMECA attributes in the DAHAZID analysis require two types of data; 1) process 
design data by using SQL code with an EXCEL file that was made with SP P&ID® and 2) 
FPFM data from reliable data sources.  
 
 
 
Figure 35. SQL code for FMECA (extraction of data of interest) 
 
 
The SQL results in Figure 35 show the process design conditions of this BFW system. At 
this stage, the primary design values are retrieved (design pressures, temperatures, and 
design duty, etc.) because HAZID-engineers will determine whether proper designs have 
  
101 
 
been proposed based on this information. Consequently, the process data are integrated 
with the FPFM data, as shown in Table 22. For reference, the used SQL coding will be 
displayed clearly in Appendix E.    
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Table 22. FMECA-attribute case study in DAHAZID for EQ  
 
Reliability data are adopted from OREDA (2015). It does not mean that the quoted values will be the ones for the current case under specified conditions. 
Moreover, reliability values will show spread from one equipment item to another. Therefore in case of a later, more detailed quantitative risk analysis, 
estimated uncertainties will be included.  
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    Table 23. FMECA-attribute case study in new HAZID for valves  
 
 Reliability data are adopted from OREDA (2015) 
1) Based on the calendar time, the mean values of all failure modes are selected. 
BFW system ( for control valves)
Item Tag Description
Design 
Pressure 
[PSIG]
Design 
Tem. 
[F]
Fluid Check Reliability
 1)
[per 106 hrs]
Fail to open on 
demand
[per 106 hrs]
Environ. Human Error Possible impacts on Check
Impacts on 
Environ.
[per 106 hrs.]
Check
LCV-3111 Control valve 180 620 DWM 38.03 19.02 All
1. V-003 
2. BFW supply -
PCV-3111 Control valve F.V/ 85 620 LP 38.03 19.02 All
1. V-003 
2. BFW supply -
LCV-3117 Control valve 90 F.V / 620 WW 38.03 19.02 All V-003 -
TCV-3123 Control valve 1600 320 BFW 38.03 19.02 All
1. V-003 
2. BFW supply -
FV-3121A
Automatic 
recirculate  
valve
1600 320 BFW - - Abnormal
1. P-004
2. BFW supply -
XV-3121 Emergency 
Shut-off valve
F.V/ 630 775 MP 10.69 - Abnormal 1. P-004
2. BFW supply
7.12
shut-off 
valve 
(ball type)
PSV-3111 Pressure 
safety valve
90 F.V / 620 LP or DMW 6.10 1.32 Abnormal V-003 -
Note
FMECA
Subsystem :
Component Process Conditions Failure Probability Failure Mode 
Operating 
phase
Consequence
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5.4  Comparison of DAHAZID vs. HAZOP  
In this chapter, a case study is performed with the actual existing process of a BFW system. 
To clarify the potential in the DAHAZID analysis, this section compares this analysis to 
a HAZOP study22, as shown in Table 24.  
 
 
Table 24. Comparison between DAHAZID and HAZOP  
No. Classification 
Type of HAZID 
DAHAZID HAZOP 
1 
Required 
process in 
advance 
Individual participants 
should review possible 
fault modes by filling in 
the prepopulated 
worksheets of the 
DAHAZID method 
Participants who are in 
charge should prepare the 
process documents. In fact, 
there is no essential 
requirement 
2 
Process 
sequence in the 
HAZID meeting 
Based on the prepared 
worksheets, participants 
discuss their opinions and 
deliberate based on the 
information 
After brief explanations of 
the process concerned, the 
participants state their 
opinions in a brainstorming 
approach, along with several 
guidewords and process 
parameters 
 
                                                 
22 Because the system is part of an actual plant and the detailed information is confidential, in this thesis 
the outcome of the conventional HAZOP study cannot be shown in detail. However, the outcome was 
almost the same with the result of DAHAZID except for several aspects which are mentioned in this 
subsection. This table compares the actions occurring in the two approaches.    
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Table 24. Continued 
No. Classification 
Type of HAZID 
DAHAZID HAZOP 
3 Initial point 
Consistent mode Inconsistent mode 
With a prepopulated 
worksheet after selecting 
one piece of equipment as 
reference equipment  
Different outcomes occur 
because of HAZOP facilitator 
or participants dependencies 
4 Fault scenarios 
Consistent mode Inconsistent mode 
After filling in the 
prepopulated worksheets, 
equipment failure 
scenarios are chosen from 
accumulated data 
During the HAZOP study, 
participants simulate possible 
scenarios and discuss them 
together 
5 Safeguards 
Consistent mode Inconsistent mode 
Based on equipment 
failure modes, the 
DAHAZID method 
recommends three types 
of safeguards:  
1) inherently 
safer/passive,  
2) active, and 
3) procedure 
Different outcomes occur 
dependent on the preferences 
and experience of HAZOP 
facilitator or participants 
6 Uniqueness 
This requires a systematic 
review of the influence of 
other systems     
Participants can freely 
suggest any recommendations 
(e.g., mismanagement of 
manual valves, impacts on 
other systems) 
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In comparison with a conventional HAZOP study, the outcome of the BFW system in the 
DAHAZID analysis covers all scenarios, except those that are outside the scope of this 
system (BFW system) and deal with manual valves. However, these issues are solved if 
the SQL program is manipulated and run again. Firstly, regarding manual valves, the 
previous prepopulated HAZOP worksheet was designed exclusively for control valves, 
not manual valves. Based on the fact that SP P&ID® includes all data including manual 
valves, we can also add manual valve data by using SQL.  
  
 
 
Figure 36. Sorted manual valve list from Microsoft® SQL Server 
 
 
Figure 36 shows the extracted valve list of the BFW system from the SQL code. Therefore, 
the manual valve can be considered an intrinsic fault case or a fault case linked to human 
error. Furthermore, it is expected to identify influences from other systems in the current 
DAHAZID analysis. In other words, this novel method considers connections with other 
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subsystems so that we can also predict conditions if these are disconnected. Further 
communications of units can be reviewed, provided that there are enough data regarding 
other subsystems.  
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6.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter concludes with the key characteristics of this study on Data-based semi-
Automatic Hazard Identification (DAHAZID) and opportunities for the application of this 
methodology, followed by a statement of possible future work.        
 
6.1  Conclusions (Characteristics of the DAHAZID analysis) 
This thesis has led to the principle and viability of the DAHAZID analysis and its 
prepopulated worksheets. Chapter 3 presented the required factors of DAHAZID, and the 
analysis was developed in compliance with the three main objectives presented in 
Subsection 1.2. The case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 served to test the possibility of the 
new semi-automatic tool by taking into account basic projects and existing process plants, 
respectively. This section elucidates the two main characteristics of the DAHAZID 
methodology.      
 
6.1.1 The trade-off between sophistication and simplicity 
The DAHAZID methodology primarily seeks a simple but deliberately effective approach 
compared to stand alone HAZOP and FMECA. In this sense, the new DAHAZID method 
has employed the usefulness of two high-tech computer applications (SP P&ID® and SQL 
code).  By using them, this DAHAZID analysis represents a novel way of increasing the 
completeness and efficiency of HAZID. Rather than examining each component 
separately, the combination of components into the functioning plant in DAHAZID 
enables people to perceive the “bigger picture.” Thus, thanks to the high-tech applications, 
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the DAHAZID analysis derived this overall insight both from an individual and from a 
team perspective. Moreover, to achieve a comprehensive understanding with hazard 
identification by assuming a fault/deviation, it is imperative to follow proper connections 
between the components of a system in fluid-flow directions, which can be extracted from 
the SP P&ID®. Through these links, HAZOP and FMECA attributes in DAHAZID are 
supposed to perform semi-automatically while retaining “human-in-the-loop” to 
overcome the current limitations of each type of analysis. Consequently, there is room to 
increase the applications of computerized technologies in the DAHAZID analysis.   
However, simplicity is are not always correct. For example, even though the tools are 
employed to enhance simplicity, the usage can have drawbacks due to the intrinsic 
complexity of new technologies. Consequently, the balance of, “trade-off between 
sophistication and simplicity” is indispensable to the process of developing the DAHAZID 
analysis. The representative five trade-offs associated with the DAHAZID analysis are as 
follows:     
 
1st trade-off: SmartPlant P&ID between strengths and weaknesses 
Strengths:    The SP P&ID®, commercialized by Intergraph, readily offers various 
process data inserted in P&ID. Similar to AutoCAD® P&ID, this software produces 
process system graphs. In addition, SP P&ID® incorporates the process data of the process 
system graphs simultaneously. For this reason, we do not have to deal with several process 
documents, so we can save time and obtain highly reliable data that we input with SP 
P&ID®.        
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Weakness:    By using SP P&ID®, several challenging issues arose, compared to the 
traditional AutoCAD® P&ID. Most of all, initially it turns out somewhat difficult to use 
this software. For a computer science novice, in the beginning, nearly every step appears 
to be demanding, from the installation of the program to understanding its principles and 
multiple subprograms. Consequently, it takes some time to adapt to the SP P&ID® 
environment. 
 
2nd trade-off: Data reduction by application of SQL  
Strengths:    DATA mining, such as the standard query language SQL code in DAHAZID, 
facilitates dealing with intricate process data and sorting so that we can obtain the needed 
data quickly. Other methodologies have been struggling to identify connections among 
process components using different methods to track the causality of faults. The 
DAHAZID analysis with the aid of the SQL code commences its process with finding the 
linkages within the process system. Therefore, possible incident scenarios are expected to 
appear immediately and consistently.       
Weakness:    Similar to utilizing SP P&ID®, it is initially necessary to become familiar 
with the SQL software for the preparation of proper SQL coding. Furthermore, the 
preparation demands overall understanding of chemical plants to select the right data from 
amongst a significant amount of information. An understanding of the principles of 
process safety concepts also is required to develop possible scenarios with the SQL code. 
After gaining the required insight with the aid of SQL, we can adequately frame the hazard 
identification tools.    
  
111 
 
3rd trade-off: “Flow” as the main guide for fault propagation 
Strengths:    DAHAZID adopts a single process variable, flow, as the primary guide for 
fault effect propagation for two main reasons. Firstly, it is believed that nearly all possible 
faults and failure modes in the chemical process occur due to flow deviation from the 
normal cause a flow deviation. Physically, flow, temperature, and pressure are related. 
Moreover, flow can be regarded as the fundamental carrier of cause-effect information 
downstream or upstream. In the extracted data, flow can be tracked between linked parts 
of equipment (and not internally a piece of equipment). Secondly, this approach facilitates 
scenario thinking along flow directions and generates relatively logical outcomes with 
respect to causality. For these reasons, by focusing only on “flow” at the start the 
DAHAZID analysis achieves cause-effect chain scenarios in a simpler way than 
conventional HAZOP.  
Weakness:       Regarding the use of flow as the fundamental guide variable of fault effect 
propagation requires discussion. Most of all, this approach might fail to cover all possible 
scenarios, or it will make it more difficult. For example, a case associated with no flow 
may still require checking both in normal upstream and downstream directions for possible 
effects and in case of a process including chemical mixtures, the partial flows of individual 
mixture constituents should be followed. Additionally, this approach shall not impede the 
freedom of brainstorming of a HAZOP study that examines all deviations by selecting one 
or a multiple of process variables. These possible weaknesses shall in be investigated in a 
continued study.  
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4th trade-off: From cause to consequence and cure 
Potential:    The DAHAZID analysis attempts to define the possible scenarios of control 
faults or equipment failure modes and the safeguards to mitigate possible effects. The idea 
behind DAHAZID is to develop a “nonstop service” automatically from fault diagnosis to 
a reliable recommendation for enhanced safety management. Even though experts may 
propose many good recommendations during a HAZOP meeting, important possibilities 
might still be overlooked. For this reason, the DAHAZID analysis utilizes the accumulated 
recommendations of the CCPS (1998) guideline, which incorporates in tabulated form 
nearly all failure cases of chemical plant equipment. Of course, these suggestions can in 
an actual case be updated. Through this process, the outcomes of the DAHAZID 
methodology can be maintained consistently without depending only on the ability and 
experience of an individual expert.   
Counter-effect:    Relying heavily on well-prepared circumstances regarding fault and 
failure modes and safeguards, and not questioning an accepted state of affairs sufficiently, 
can be risky. However, there is no perfect answer. In the light of adverse effects, 
organizations that might employ this approach should arrange conditions in which people 
are stimulated and motivated to engage in discussions readily and freely, and update and 
improve recommendations to their company.   
 
5th trade-off: Automated vs. Semi-automated approach 
Automation:    As conventional HAZID may be wearing people out, it would be useful 
indeed to obtain results with less human effort. For this reason, DAHAZID sought 
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application of automation tools by using new technologies and existing reliable data 
sources.  
Semi-automation:    Similar to the reason given in the section 2.4 “From cause to 
consequence and cure”, adoption of results obtained through “mechanical” processes by 
just relying on software without any questioning is unacceptable. Process safety analysis 
deals with the prevention of loss of life, which demands prudence and responsibility 
regarding its results. Producing cues for the thinking process is good; people should 
become familiar with all the ins and outs of the process. Consequently, from the beginning 
of this research, the DAHAZID analysis intentionally pursues a semi-automated (not 
completely automated) preparation tool to reduce errors and boring work and enable 
people to engage more effectively in the HAZID process proper. DAHAZID leaves room 
for proactive approaches. 1) The prepopulated worksheets are designed to stimulate 
people’s imaginations as a checklist does, but should leave space to insert uncommon 
cause and effect events emerging from the team deliberations, 2) The two basic sources, 
possible scenarios and safeguards, of prepopulated worksheets in DAHAZID can be 
improved continually based on people’s experience.   
 
6.1.2 Opportunities of the DAHAZID methodology 
Based on the above-mentioned characteristics of the DAHZID method, the possible 
opportunities of the DAHAZID analysis in terms of the process safety management aspect 
are listed:  
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Boosted discussion with prepopulated-worksheets  
Because of their clear guidelines, the suggested prepopulated worksheets enable engineers 
to examine possible scenarios rigorously in advance. Rather than attending a meeting 
without any concerns, engineers/analysts can clarify their thinking with aid of the 
prepopulated worksheets before team discussions take place. Thus, the outcome of the 
DAHAZID analysis might be more effective.   
 
Unified work process within entire organization    
It would be useful to maintain a consistent analysis approach among individuals across 
their entire organization. Of course, this worksheet needs substantial improvement, but a 
worksheet that has equivalent formats guides the identical analysis approach regardless of 
personal experiences. Therefore, we do not have to be solely dependent a minority of 
experts, and this method can be used for the purpose of training, especially regarding 
process safety designs. But it will also be of great value to the operational stage in case 
new potential scenarios are discovered. These new findings can be easily added to the 
worksheets. However, it will also be of great value to the operational stage in case new 
potential scenarios are discovered. These new findings can be easily added to the 
worksheets. 
Practicality in any stage projects     
Because the possible cause/consequence items are shown readily, the DAHAZID analysis 
can be exploited for any stage projects (e.g., basic, Front End Engineering Design (FEED), 
Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) projects) and even for Management 
of Change (MOC) in the operational stage. Consequently, this new method leads to time 
and hence, cost-saving  
6.2  Future work 
Several opportunities of the current DAHAZID methodology can be suggested: 
Visualization of Causality by Using Bowtie and Bayesian Networks 
Based on the current stage (ongoing steps) in Figure 24 in Chapter 3, this research can be 
taken further by combining the identified scenarios into clusters in a bowtie structure and 
mapping the bowtie analysis into a Bayesian network. The next steps of the proposal can 
produce visual causal relationships and quantification to effectively diagnose possible root 
causes according to their relative probabilities. In addition, this study can be extended to 
abnormal, start-up, turn-around, or batch operation conditions.  
Construction of Database 
It is reasonable to assume that “if you put garbage in, garbage will come out.” To obtain 
realistic results with the DAHAZID methodology, future studies should construct a valid 
and reliable computerized database. According Unni Krishnan (2005), one of the main 
reasons to occur similar or same incidents respectively, it is uncommon for companies to 
accumulate their knowledge which can be passed to the next generation. For this reason, 
based on previous incidents, the database should incorporate updated failure scenarios and 
safeguards for different types of chemical processes or fluids. It can also add other failures 
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that presumably occur because of the environment, possible domino effects, human and 
procedural errors, or organizational weaknesses in DAHAZID.  
Human Factors 
More information on human and organizational factors would help to establish a greater 
degree of accuracy with the DAHAZID methodology. The information on human factors 
can be associated with the individual and organizations. Regarding the individual, we 
should carefully consider process procedures, which are not to be dissociated from other 
safeguards. Additionally, further research is needed to understand the influence of safety 
management systems better.  
System Approach 
Various researchers (Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2011; Perrow, 2011; Rasmussen & 
Suedung, 2000) have stressed that trying to identify all possible scenarios of what can go 
wrong by decomposing the system into components and focusing on faults will fail. Events 
following from a dysfunctional interaction of rightly functioning components will be 
overlooked. This kind of mishaps has to be identified by a system-theoretic tool as 
developed by Leveson. Practical inclusion of this in a computerized tool will be a 
challenge. 
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6.3  Summary of conclusions 
This research proposed the Data-based semi-Automatic Hazard Identification (DAHAZID) 
analysis to improve on classic HAZID tools. This method enables the determination of 
possible causes and consequences in a system from the HAZOP functioning perspective, 
including operational errors, whereas FMECA will check the effects of a system’s possible 
failure modes, including those from its environment, the problems intrinsic to each piece 
of equipment from loading and material wear, and human errors that occur in construction, 
operation, and maintenance. This notion in the DAHAZID methodology was realized 
through prepopulated worksheets with the aid of new technologies, SP P&ID® and the 
SQL language. Throughout this research, there were many trade-offs between 
sophisticated and simple modes for a better practical identification tool.   
 
The research makes contributions towards the current HAZID field, in which safeguards 
are considered separately from fault scenarios and generated in a brainstorming approach, 
and people tend to rely heavily on individual experts.        
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APPENDIX A  
 
Regulations associated with PHA 
Governmental regulations related to identifying and evaluating process hazards 
(CCPS, 2008) 
Country or region Regulation 
United States 
29 CFR 1910.119, US. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety 
Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals 
40 CFR 68, US. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Risk Management Program for Chemical 
Accident Release Prevention 
United Kingdom U.K. Health, Safety Executive, Control of Major Hazards (COMAH) regulations 
South Korea 
Industrial Safety and Health Act -Article 20, 
Preparation of Safety and Health Management 
Regulations 
Australia National Standard for Control of Major Hazard Facilities [NOHSC:1014 (1996)l 
European Union 
Seveso II Directive 2003/105/EC 
ATEX 137 Workplace Directive 1999/92/EC 
Mexico NOM-028-STPS-2004, Occupational organization - Safety in the Processes of Chemical Substances 
Singapore National Environment Agency  (one-time QRA Report for new chemical plants) 
 
This table represent several countries’ regulation lists regarding hazard identification and 
evaluation.  
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APPENDIX B  
 
The CSB incidents reviewed by Baybutt (2016a) 
No. Incident Incident date Report date PSM
1 PHA2 
1 Sonat Exploration Co. Catastrophic Vessel Over pressurization 3/4/1998 9/21/2000 N N 
2 Morton International Inc. Runaway Chemical Reaction, Explosion and Fire 4/8/1998 8/16/2000 N Y 
3 Concept Sciences Hydroxylamine Explosion 2/19/1999 2/1/2002 Y Y 
4 Tosco Avon Refinery Petroleum Naphtha Fire 2/23/1999 3/21/2001 Y N 
5 Bethlehem Steel Corporation Gas Condensate Fire 2/2/2001 12/6/2001 N N 
6 BP Amoco Thermal Decomposition Incident 3/13/2001 5/20/2002 N Y 
7 Motiva Enterprises Sulfuric Acid Tank Explosion 7/17/2001 8/28/2002 N Y 
8 Georgia-Pacific Corp. Hydrogen Sulfide Leak 1/16/2002 11/20/2002 N N 
9 Third Coast Industries Petroleum Products Facility Fire 5/1/2002 3/6/2003 N U 
10 DPC Enterprises Festus Chlorine Release 8/14/2002 5/1/2003 Y U 
11 First Chemical Corp. Reactive Chemical Explosion and Fire 10/13/2002 10/15/2003 N N 
12 Environmental Enterprises Hydrogen Sulfide Release 12/11/2002 9/17/2003 N U 
13 Catalyst Systems Inc. Reactive Chemical Explosion and Fire 1/2/2003 10/29/2003 N N 
14 BLSR Operating Ltd. Vapor Cloud Deflagration and Fire 1/13/2003 9/17/2003 N U 
15 West Pharmaceutical Services Dust Explosion and Fire 1/29/2003 9/23/2004 N N 
Y -yes, N-No, U-Unknown 
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No. Incident Incident date Report date PSM
1 PHA2 
16 Technic Inc. Ventilation System Explosion and Fire 2/7/2003 8/20/2004 N N 
17 CTA Acoustics Dust Explosion and Fire 2/20/2003 2/15/2005 N N 
18 D.D. Williamson & Co. Catastrophic Vessel Failure 4/11/2003 3/12/2004 N N 
19 
Honeywell Chemical Releases 
 (3 incidents)   8/8/2005     
a. Chlorine 7/20/2003  Y Y 
b. Antimony pentachloride 7/29/2003  N N 
c. Hydrogen fluoride  8/13/2003  Y N 
20 Isotec/Sigma Aldrich Nitric Oxide Explosion 9/21/2003 8/24/2004 Y Y 
21 Hayes Lemmerz Dust Explosions and Fire 10/29/2003 9/27/2005 N N 
22 DPC Enterprises Glendale Chlorine Release 11/17/2003 2/28/2007 Y Y 
23 Giant Industries Oil Refinery Explosion and Fire 4/8/2004 10/26/2005 Y Y 
24 MFG Chemical Inc. Toxic Gas Release 4/12/2004 4/11/2006 Y N 
25 Formosa Plastics Vinyl Chloride Explosion 4/23/2004 3/6/2007 Y Y 
26 Sterigenics Ethylene Oxide Explosion 8/19/2004 3/30/2006 Y Y 
27 Marcus Oil and Chemical Tank Explosion and Fire 12/3/2004 6/6/2006 N N 
28 Acetylene Service Company Gas Explosion 1/25/2005 1/26/2006 Y Y 
29 BP Texas City Refinery Explosion and Fire 3/23/2005 3/20/2007 Y Y 
30 Formosa Plastics Propylene Fire and Explosions 10/6/2005 7/20/2006 Y Y 
Y -yes, N-No, U-Unknown 
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No. Incident Incident date Report date PSM
1 PHA2 
31 Bethune Point Wastewater Plant Explosion and Fire 1/11/2006 3/13/2007 N N 
32 Synthron Chemical Reaction and Vapor Cloud Explosion 1/31/2006 7/31/2007 Y N 
33 Partridge Raleigh Oilfield Explosion and Fire 6/5/2006 6/12/2007 N N 
34 Universal Form Clamp Co. Explosion and Fire 6/14/2006 4/10/2007 Y N 
35 EQ Hazardous Waste Plant Explosions and Fire 10/5/2006 4/16/2008 N U 
36 CAI/Arnel Chemical Plant Explosion 11/22/2006 5/13/2008 Y N 
37 Valero Refinery Propane Fire 2/16/2007 7/9/2008 Y Y 
38 Barton Solvents Explosions and Fire 7/17/2007 6/26/2008 N U 
39 Xcel Energy Company Hydroelectric Tunnel Fire 10/2/2007 8/25/2010 N Y 
40 Barton Solvents Flammable Liquid Explosion and Fire 10/29/2007 9/18/2008 N U 
41 T2 Laboratories Inc. Reactive Chemical Explosion 12/19/2007 9/15/2009 N N 
42 Imperial Sugar Company Dust Explosion and Fire 2/7/2008 9/24/2009 N U 
43 Goodyear Heat Exchanger Rupture and Ammonia Release 6/11/2008 1/27/2011 Y U 
44 Packaging Corporation Storage Tank Explosion 7/29/2008 3/4/2010 N N 
45 Bayer CropScience Pesticide Waste Tank Explosion 8/28/2008 1/20/2011 Y Y 
46 INDSPEC Chemical Corporation Oleum Release 10/11/2008 9/30/2009 Y Y 
47 Allied Terminals Fertilizer Tank Collapse 11/11/2008 5/26/2009 N N 
Y -yes, N-No, U-Unknown 
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No. Incident Incident date Report date PSM
1 PHA2 
48 Veolia Environmental Services Flammable Vapor Explosion and Fire 5/4/2009 7/21/2010 Y N 
49 ConAgra Natural Gas Explosion 6/9/2009 2/4/2010 N U 
50 CITGO Refinery Fire and Hydrofluoric Acid Release 7/19/2009 12/9/2009 Y Y 
51 Caribbean Petroleum Refining Tank Explosion and Fire 10/23/2009 10/21/2015 N N 
52 Silver Eagle Refinery Explosion 11/4/2009 4/14/2014 Y U 
53 NDK Crystal Inc. Explosion 12/7/2009 11/14/2013 N U 
54 
DuPont Corporation Toxic Chemical 
Releases (3 incidents)   9/20/2011     
a. Methyl chloride 1/22/2010  U U 
b. Oleum  1/23/2010  U U 
c. Phosgene 1/23/2010  Y Y 
55 Kleen Energy Natural Gas Explosion 2/7/2010 6/28/2010 N U 
56 Tesoro Refinery Explosion and Fire 4/2/2010 5/1/2014 Y Y 
57 Horsehead Holding Company Explosion and Fire 7/22/2010 3/11/2015 N U 
58 Millard Refrigerated Services Ammonia Release 8/23/2010 1/15/2015 U U 
59 E. I. DuPont De Nemours Co. Hotwork Explosion 11/9/2010 4/19/2012 Y Y 
60 AL Solutions Dust Explosion 12/9/2010 7/16/2014 N U 
61 Carbide Industries Fire and Explosion 3/21/2011 2/7/2013 N U 
62 Hoeganaes Corporation Flash Fires and Explosion 5/27/2011 1/5/2012 U U 
63 Chevron Refinery Fire 8/6/2012 1/28/2015 Y Y 
64 US Ink Fire 10/9/2012 1/15/2015 U U 
Y: yes, N: No, U-Unknown 
With the table above, the table represents the possible underlying causes based on the 
analysis of Baybutt (2016a) 
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Data from: Baybutt (2016a) 
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APPENDIX C  
 
BACKDATA FOR HAZOP 
C.1 Brief history of HAZOP 
The genesis of HAZOP study was proposed by the Imperial Chemical Industries in the 
early 1970s (Pasman, 2015). Ever afterward, HAZOP has evolved to overcome its 
weaknesses. Lawley (1974) carried out the fundamental principles of HAZOP on the paper 
“Operability Studies and Hazard Analysis,” and Chemical Industries Association 
launched an official guide for the study in 1977. According to Dunjó et al., (2010), the 
HAZOP research areas actively has been conducted, and the majority of tasks (after 
the1990s) perused automatic HAZOP approaches as follows.  
 
 
Classifications of HAZOP research areas   
(Dunjó, Fthenakis, Vílchez, & Arnaldos, 2010)  
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C.2 A generic process of HAZOP study
Modified from the book of Crawley and Tyler (2015) 
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This working diagram represents a relatively systematic approach, whereas it points to 
how engineers should repeat similar processes during one meeting and participants 
simulate possible scenarios depending on their gut feeling.  
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C.3 Useful resources related to a HAZOP study (Dunjó et al., 2010) 
 
 
Year Author/Institution Title Paper Guideline Book Standard
1974 Lawley Operability Studies And Hazard Analysis ■
1977 CIA A Guide to Hazard and Operability Studies ■
1981 Knowlton Hazards and Operability Studies, The Guideword Approach ■
1983 Kletz “HAZOP & HAZAN”. Identifying and Assessing Process     Industry Hazards (first edition) ■
1986 Kletz “HAZOP & HAZAN”. Identifying and Assessing Process    Industry Hazards (second edition) ■
1996 Lees Loss Prevention in Process Industries Hazard Identification,   Assessment and Control ■
1991 HSE Guidance on HAZOP Procedures for Computer-controlled Plants ■
1992 Kletz “HAZOP & HAZAN”. Identifying and Assessing Process   Industry Hazards (third edition) ■
1992 CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures ■
1994 Nolan Application of HAZOP and What-if Safety Reviews to the Petroleum, Petrochemical and Chemical Industries ■
1996 Wells Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment ■
1999 Kletz “HAZOP & HAZAN”. Identifying and Assessing Process   Industry Hazards (fourth edition) ■
1999 Redmill System Safety: HAZOP and Software HAZOP ■
2000 EPSC HAZOP: Guide to Best Practice. Guidelines to Best Practice for the Process and Chemical Industries ■
2001 BS IEC 61882 Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP Studies)—Application Guide ■
2004 McDonald Practical HAZOPs, Trips and Alarms ■
  
136 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
SYNTAX OF HAZOP ATTRIBUTE 
D.1 SQL Code for HAZOP-Path 1 (Microsoft® SQL Server 2012 program) 
 
@V_EQUIPMENT VARCHAR(50); 
SET @V_EQUIPMENT= 'E-003'; 
BEGIN      
SELECT * FROM 
(SELECT  
(SELECT FROM_EQUIPMENT FROM 
dbo.GET_CONNECTION_OTHER_SYSTEMS_INLET(temp.from_equipment)) AS 
Inlet_Other_System, 
temp.From_Equipment as 'Inlet Line', 
left(temp.From_Equipment, charindex('-', temp.From_Equipment)-1) as 'Fluid', 
pv.[Item Tag] as 'Fault Valve', 
pv.[Instr Class] as 'Valve Type', 
@v_equipment as 'Reference Equipment', 
temp.to_equipment as 'Outlet Line', 
(SELECT consequence FROM 
dbo.GET_CONNECTION_CONSEQUENCE(temp.to_equipment)) AS 
'Consequence_Equipment1', 
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(SELECT to_equipment FROM 
dbo.GET_CONNECTION_OTHER_SYSTEMS_OUTLET(temp.to_equipment)) AS 
Outlet_Other_System 
  FROM 
 (SELECT c2.From_Equipment, 
 c1.To_Equipment 
 FROM  Connection$ c1, 
    Connection$ c2 
 WHERE c1.From_Equipment=@v_equipment 
 and c2.To_Equipment=c1.From_Equipment)TEMP 
LEFT OUTER JOIN Pipeline_Valve pv 
 ON pv.[PipeRun Item Tag]= temp.from_Equipment 
 AND pv.[Instr Class] IN ('Control valves and regulators','Relief devices'))TEMP2 
WHERE (TEMP2.Inlet_Other_System is not null or [Fault Valve] is not null) 
AND (TEMP2.Consequence_Equipment1 IS NOT NULL OR 
TEMP2.Outlet_Other_System IS NOT NULL); 
 
 
END; 
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D.2 SQL Code for HAZOP-Path 2 (Microsoft® SQL Server 2012) 
 
@V_EQUIPMENT VARCHAR(50); 
SET @V_EQUIPMENT= 'E-003'; 
BEGIN  
   SELECT * FROM 
   (SELECT temp.To_Equipment AS 'Outlet line',  
          left(temp.To_Equipment, charindex('-', temp.To_Equipment)-1) as 'Fluid', 
    (SELECT consequence FROM 
dbo.GET_CONNECTION_CONSEQUENCE(temp.To_Equipment)) AS 'Equipment', 
    temp.[Item Tag] AS 'Fault Valve',  
    temp.[Instr Class] AS 'Valve type',     
    temp.From_Equipment AS 'Ref. Equipment', 
    c2.to_equipment as 'Outlet Piping', 
       (SELECT consequence FROM 
dbo.GET_CONNECTION_CONSEQUENCE(c2.To_Equipment)) AS 'Consequence 
Equipment', 
       (SELECT to_equipment FROM 
dbo.GET_CONNECTION_OTHER_SYSTEMS_OUTLET(c2.To_Equipment)) AS 
'Other System' 
   FROM 
   (SELECT c1.From_Equipment, 
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           c1.To_Equipment,  
     pv.[Item Tag],  
     pv.[Instr Class],  
     pv.fluid,  
     (SELECT consequence FROM 
dbo.GET_CONNECTION_CONSEQUENCE(C1.To_Equipment)) AS 'Equipment' 
   FROM Connection$ c1 
   LEFT OUTER JOIN Pipeline_Valve pv 
   ON pv.[PipeRun Item Tag]= c1.to_equipment 
   AND pv.[Instr Class] IN ('Control valves and regulators','Relief devices') 
   WHERE c1.From_Equipment=@V_EQUIPMENT)TEMP 
   LEFT OUTER JOIN Connection$ c2 
   ON c2.From_Equipment= Temp.Equipment)TEMP2 
   WHERE (TEMP2.[Equipment] IS NOT NULL OR TEMP2.[Fault Valve] IS NOT 
NULL); 
END; 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SQL Code for FMECA (Microsoft® SQL Server 2012) 
select [Item Tag], 
Name, 
Description, 
[Design Max Press], 
[Design Min Press], 
[Design Max Temp], 
[Differential Press], 
[Rated Capacity], 
[Design Duty], 
[MOC Class], 
[Insul Purpose] 
from fmea_eq; 
 
